Lectures on Land Warfare | Page 6

provision of great masses of motor
transport--have introduced new problems of considerable complexity
concerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and services.
Much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new
devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery
already working" (Marshal Haig).
The laws of war are not in themselves difficult to understand, but their
successful application on the field of battle requires that they should be
carefully studied and considered in all their aspects. "The mind can
only be trained to this by close study of campaigns, and by the solution
of definite problems on maps and on the ground" (General Sir E. B.
Hamley). "A lifelong experience of military study and thought has
taught me that the principle of the tactical employment of troops must
be instinctive. I know that in putting the Science of War into practice it
is necessary that its main tenets should form, so to speak, part of one's
flesh and blood. In war there is little time to think, and the right thing to
do must come like a flash--it must present itself to the mind as perfectly
obvious" (Marshal French). The same idea is expressed by the
Generalissimo of the largest victorious force that was ever controlled
by one mind. "Generally speaking, grave situations partially obscure
even a bright intellect. It is therefore with a fully equipped mind that
one ought to start in order to make war or even to understand {3} war.
No study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one
can in order to apply what one knows. In order to do even a little one
has to know a great deal, and to know it well. . . . The right solution
imposes itself; namely, the application, according to circumstances, of
fixed principles. . . . Incapacity and ignorance cannot be called
extenuating circumstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all"
(Marshal Foch); and in the words of Napoleon's own maxim: "The only
way to learn the art of war is to read and re-read the campaigns of the
great captains."
THE "COMMON-SENSE" FALLACY.--The fallacy that warfare is
"merely a matter of common sense" has been exposed by Colonel G. F.
R. Henderson, in his contrast of the conduct of the American Civil War

of 1861-1865, when it was controlled by President Lincoln and his
Cabinet in Washington, and when it was handed over without reserve
to a professional soldier in the field (General Grant). Few mortals have
possessed "common sense" in greater abundance than Abraham
Lincoln, and yet he permitted interference with his generals' plans,
which were frequently brought to nought by such interference, and but
for a like hindrance of the Confederate generals by Jefferson Davis this
well-intentioned "common sense" would have been even more
disastrous. "Men who, aware of their ignorance, would probably have
shrunk from assuming charge of a squad of infantry in action had no
hesitation whatever in attempting to direct a mighty army" (Henderson,
"Stonewall Jackson").
In June, 1863, the Confederate Armies were scattered from Strasburg
(in the Valley) to Fredericksburg (in Spottsylvania); General Hooker,
commanding the Army of the Potomac in the field, begged to be
allowed to attack Lee's Corps in detail. Success was certain, but
permission was refused. The one and only idea of the Federal
Government was to keep the Army of the Potomac between Lee and
the Federal Capital.
{4}
THE "HIGHER RANKS" FALLACY.--The same writer has also
protested vehemently against the idea that the practice of strategy in the
field is confined to the higher ranks. "Every officer in charge of a
detached force or flying column, every officer who for the time being
has to act independently, every officer in charge of a patrol, is
constantly brought face to face with strategical considerations; and
success or failure, even where the force is insignificant, will depend
upon his familiarity with strategical principles" ("The Science of War").
In the same way, General Sir E. B. Hamley, in "The Operations of War
Explained," points out that a commander who cannot look beyond the
local situation is not competent to command a detachment, however
small. In addition, it must be remembered that superior knowledge of
the art of war, thorough acquaintance with duty, and large experience,
seldom fail to command submission and respect. Troops fight with

marked success when they feel that their leader "knows his job," and in
every Army troops are the critics of their leaders. The achievements of
Jackson's forces in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 were
almost superhuman, but under Stonewall Jackson the apparently
impossible tasks were undertaken and achieved. General Ewell, one of
Jackson's commanders, stated that he shivered whenever one of
Stonewall's couriers approached him. "I was always expecting him to
order