Independent Bohemia | Page 8

bitterly opposed the encroachments of Germanism,
and saw in it their chief enemy. The Czech leader Palacký rejected the
invitation to Frankfurt in 1848 and summoned a Slav Congress to
Prague. It is true that Palacký at that time dreamt of an Austria just to
all her nations. He advocated a strong Austria as a federation of nations
to counterbalance Pan-Germanism. Yet at the same time Palacký has
proved through his history and work that Bohemia has full right to

independence. He was well aware that a federalistic and just Austria
would have to grant independence to the Czecho-Slovaks. But later on
he gave up his illusions about the possibility of a just Austria, when he
saw that she abandoned the Slavs entirely to German-Magyar
hegemony, and declared that Bohemia existed before Austria and
would also exist after her. In 1866 he wrote:
"I myself now give up all hope of a long preservation of the Austrian
Empire; not because it is not desirable or has no mission to fulfil, but
because it allowed the Germans and Magyars to grasp the reins of
government and to found in it their racial tyranny."
Exasperated by the pact of dualism which the Czechs never recognised,
Palacký went to Moscow and on his return declared:
"I have already said that I do not cherish any hopes of the preservation
of Austria, especially since the Germans and Magyars made it the home
of their racial despotism; the question therefore as to what will happen
to the Slavs hitherto living in Austria is not without significance.
Without attempting to prophesy future events which for a mortal man it
is difficult to foreshadow, I may say from my inner conviction that the
Czechs as a nation, if they fell under the subjection of either Russia or
Prussia, would never rest contented. It would never fade from their
memory that according to right or justice they should be ruled by
themselves, that is by their own government and by their own
sovereign. They would regard the Prussians as their deadly enemies on
account of their germanising rage. But as to the Russians, the Czechs
would regard them as their racial brothers and friends; they would not
become their faithful subjects, but their true allies and, if need be,
vanguards in Europe."
Moreover, modern Czech politicians always clearly saw what the
Germans were aiming at. Dr. Kramár, for instance, foresaw the present
situation with remarkable perspicacity. In the Revue de Paris for
February, 1899, he wrote on "The Future of Austria," declaring that her
subject nationalities should be on guard lest she should become a vassal
of Germany and a bridge for German expansion into Asia:
"The Austrian Germans wish to see Austria subordinated to German
policy, and with the help of a subordinated Austria, the sphere of
German political and economic activity would extend from Hamburg to
Asia Minor."

Similarly also he warned Great Britain in the National Review for
October, 1902, that if Pan-German plans were realised,
"Austria would become an appanage of Germany as regards
international relations, and the policy of Europe would be obliged to
reckon, not with a free and independent Austria, but, owing to Austria's
unconditional self-surrender, with a mighty, almost invincible
Germany.... The Pan-Germans are right, the Czechs are an arrow in the
side of Germany, and such they wish to and must and will remain.
Their firm and unchangeable hope is that they will succeed in making
of themselves an impenetrable breakwater. They hope for no foreign
help; they neither wish for it nor ask for it. They have only one desire,
namely, that non-German Europe may also at last show that it
understands the meaning of the Bohemian question."
In 1906 Dr. Kramár wrote again in detail on the plans of German
domination in Central Europe, in the Adriatic and in the Near East. In a
book on Czech policy he declared that to prevent the realisation of
these plans was the vital interest of the Czech nation: "A far-seeing
Austrian policy should see in the Czech nation the safeguard of the
independence of the State." And then followed the famous passage
which formed part of the "evidence" quoted against him during his trial
for high treason:
"If Austria-Hungary continues her internal policy by centralising in
order to be better able to germanise and preserve the German character
of the State, if she does not resist all efforts for the creation of a
customs and economic union with Germany, the Pan-German
movement will prove fatal for her. To preserve and maintain a state the
sole ambition of which was to be a second German State after Germany,
would be superfluous not only for the European Powers, but also for
the non-German nations of Europe. _And if, therefore, a conflict should
break