Independent Bohemia | Page 7

Prussia into friendship. Since the Germans
in Austria began to feel their impotence in the face of the growing Slav
power, a year later the centralising efforts of the Habsburgs were
finally embodied in the system of dualism which gave over the Slavs
and Italians in Austria to German hegemony and the Slavs and
Rumanians in Hungary to Magyar tyranny. For the support of this
hegemony the Austrian Germans and Magyars, whose ambitions are
identical with those of Germany, were entirely dependent on Berlin.
Thus Austria-Hungary became inevitably Germany's partner and
vanguard in the south-east. Finally, the present war was started by the
Germans and Magyars with the object of achieving the ambitious plans
preached and expounded by Pan-German writers for years past. The
Germans wanted at all costs to become the masters of Central Europe,

to build an empire from Berlin to Bagdad, and finally to strike for
world domination.
2. In this turn of events Magyar influence played a greater part than
might be thought. Already in 1848 Kossuth defined the Hungarian
foreign policy as follows:--
"The Magyar nation is bound to maintain the most cordial relations
with the free German nation and help it in safeguarding Western
civilisation."
And while the Hungarian Slavs were prohibited from attending the
Pan-Slav Congress held in Prague in 1848, the Magyars sent two
delegates to Frankfurt in order to give practical expression to the above
Magyar policy.
The value of Hungary for the Pan-German plans has been expressed by
Friedrich List who, in 1862, dreamt of "a powerful oriental
German-Magyar Empire," and declared:
"The way towards the realisation of this plan runs through Hungary,
and while without Hungary we can do nothing, with her aid we can do
everything. Hungary is for Germany the clue to Turkey and the Near
East, and at the same time a bulwark against a superior power from the
north."
The Magyars realised from the beginning the importance of an
understanding between themselves and Prussia, and they directed their
foreign policy accordingly. The setting up of dualism in 1867, which
finally established the German-Magyar hegemony in Austria-Hungary
in the interests of Prussia, was the work of two Magyars--Julius
Andrassy and Francis Deak, who took advantage of Austria's defeat at
Sadova to further their interests. In 1870, when Vienna contemplated
revenge against Prussia, the Magyars again intervened in favour of
Prussia. When questioned as to Hungary's attitude, Andrassy, then
Premier, declared in the Hungarian Parliament that under no
circumstances would he allow any action against Prussia, and exerted
all his influence in Vienna to that effect. It was also due mainly to
Magyar influence that all attempts of the Czechs to weaken German
influence in Austria were frustrated. Francis Joseph always promised to
be crowned King of Bohemia when he wished to placate the Czechs in
times of stress for Austria: in 1861, 1865, 1870 and 1871. But he never
carried out his promises. In this he was guided not only by

considerations of dynastic interest, but also by the advice of the
Magyars.
But the most decisive and fateful exercise of Magyar influence upon
Austria's foreign policy occurred in 1879, when the Austro-German
Alliance was finally concluded. This was equally the work of Bismarck,
who spared the defeated Austria in order to make an ally of her, and of
a Magyar--Count Andrassy--who from 1871 to 1879 was the
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. It was this Magyar help which
made Bismarck utter words of gratitude and declare in 1883:
"Our political judgment leads us to the conviction that German and
Magyar interests are inseparable."
It is true that there always was a Magyar opposition against Austria
(though never against Prussia). But this opposition was used as a
weapon to extort concessions from Austria. At the bottom of their
hearts, however, the Austrian Germans were always at one with the
Magyars in their common desire to oppress the Slavs. And the
responsibility of Count Tisza for the present world catastrophe is just as
great as that of the Kaiser himself.
3. The Czechs saw clearly the progress of events. Bismarck was well
aware of the importance of Bohemia, for he declared that the master of
Bohemia would become the master of Europe. He did not desire to
annex any Austrian territory, since he knew that sooner or later
Germany would swallow the whole of Austria, as she has done in this
war. Indeed, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Bismarck did not
conceal his intention of using Austria-Hungary in Germany's interests.
At the bottom of his heart he was at one with the radical Pan-German
writers, like Lagarde, Treitschke, Mommsen, Naumann and others, who
openly declared that the Slavs should be subjugated and the Czechs, as
the most courageous and therefore the most dangerous of them,
crushed.
The Slavs always