History of the United Netherlands, 1608b | Page 3

his vehemence. Nothing could exceed the perfidy of
their great ally.
"I know that the King of France calculates thus"--wrote Aerssens at that
moment from Paris--"'If the truce lasts seven years, my son will be old
enough to accomplish the proposed marriage, and they will be obliged
to fulfil their present offers. Otherwise; I would break the truce in the
Netherlands, and my own peace with them, in order to take from the
Spaniard by force what he led me to hope from alliance.' Thus it is,"
continued the States' envoy, "that his Majesty condescends to propose,
to us a truce, which may have a double interpretation, according to the
disposition of the strongest, and thus our commonwealth will be kept in
perpetual disquiet, without knowing whether it is sovereign or not. Nor
will it be sovereign unless it shall so please our neighbour, who by this
means will always keep his foot upon our throat."
"To treat with the States as if they were free," said Henry to the
Nuncius soon afterwards, "is not to make them free. This clause does
no prejudice to the rights of the King of Spain, except for the time of
the truce." Aerssens taxed the king with having said this. His Majesty
flatly denied it. The republican envoy bluntly adduced the testimony of
the ambassadors of Venice and of Wirtemberg. The king flew into a
rage on seeing that his secrets had been divulged, and burst out with
these words: "What you demand is not reasonable. You wish the king
of Spain to renounce his rights in order to arrive at a truce. You wish to
dictate the law to him. If you had just gained four battles over him, you
could not demand more. I have always held you for sovereigns, because
I am your friend, but if you would judge by equity and justice, you are
not sovereigns. It is not reasonable that the king of Spain should quit
the sovereignty for always, and you ought to be satisfied with having it
so long as the treaty shall last."
Here was playing at sovereignty with a vengeance. Sovereignty was a
rattle for the States to amuse themselves with, until the royal infants,
French and Spanish, should be grown old enough to take the
sovereignty for good. Truly this was indeed keeping the republic under
the king's heel to be crushed at his pleasure, as Aerssens, with just
bitterness, exclaimed.
Two days were passed at the Hague in vehement debate. The deputies
of Zeeland withdrew. The deputies from Holland were divided, but, on

the whole, it was agreed to listen to propositions of truce, provided the
freedom of the United Provinces--not under conditions nor during a
certain period, but simply and for all time--should be recognised
beforehand.
It was further decided on the 14th September to wait until the end of
the month for the answer from Spain.
After the 1st of October it was distinctly intimated to the Spanish
commissioners that they must at once leave the country unless the king
had then acknowledged the absolute independence of the provinces.
A suggestion which had been made by these diplomatists to prolong the
actually existing armistice into a truce of seven years, a step which they
professed themselves willing to take upon their own responsibility, had
been scornfully rejected by the States. It was already carrying them far
enough away, they said, to take them away from a peace to a truce,
which was something far less secure than a peace, but the continuance
of this floating, uncertain armistice would be the most dangerous
insecurity of all. This would be going from firm land to slippery ice,
and from slippery ice into the water. By such a process, they would
have neither war nor peace--neither liberty of government nor freedom
of commerce--and they unanimously refused to listen to any such
schemes.
During the fortnight which followed this provisional consent of the
States, the prince redoubled his efforts to counteract the Barneveld
party.
He was determined, so far as in him lay, that the United Netherlands
should never fall back under the dominion of Spain. He had long
maintained the impossibility of effecting their thorough independence
except by continuing the war, and had only with reluctance acquiesced
in the arguments of the French ambassadors in favour of peace
negotiations. As to the truce, he vehemently assured those envoys that
it was but a trap. How could the Netherlanders know who their friends
might be when the truce should have expired, and under what
unfavourable auspices they might not be compelled to resume
hostilities?
As if he had been actually present at the council boards in Madrid and
Valladolid, or had been reading the secret letters of Friar John to
Spinola, he affirmed that the