History of the United Netherlands, 1608b | Page 2

gained liberty. Was better proof ever afforded that God alone can
protect us against those whom we trust? Who was most dangerous to
the United Provinces during those memorable peace negotiations,
Spain the avowed enemy, or France the friend?
The little republic had but her own sword, her own brain, and her own
purse to rely upon. Elizabeth was dead, and James loved Spain better
than he did the Netherlands, and quiet better than Spain. "I have told
you often," said Caron, "and I say it once more, the Spaniard is lucky
that he has such a peaceable king as this to deal with in England."
The details of the new marriage project were arranged at Paris between
the Nuncius, the Spanish ambassador, Don Pedro de Toledo, the
diplomatic agent of the archdukes, and Henry's ministers, precisely as if
there had been no negotiations going on between the States and Spain.
Yet the French king was supposed to be the nearest friend of the States,
and was consulted by them on every occasion, while his most intimate
and trusted counsellor, the ingenuous Jeannin, whose open brow was
stamped with sincerity, was privy to all their most secret deliberations.
But the statesman thus dealing with the Hollanders under such a mask
of friendly candour, knew perfectly well the reason why his
Government preferred a truce to a peace. During a prolonged truce, the
two royal children would grow old enough for the consummation of
marriage, and the States--so it was hoped--would be corrupted and
cajoled into renouncing their liberty. All the Netherlands would be then
formed into a secundogeniture for Spain, and the first sovereign would
be the husband of a French princess. Even as an object of ambition, the
prize to be secured by so much procrastination and so much treachery
was paltry.
When the Spanish commissioners came to the French and English
ambassadors accordingly, complaining of the abrupt and peremptory
tone of the States' reply, the suggestion of conferences for truce, in
place of fruitless peace negotiations, was made at once, and of course
favourably received. It was soon afterwards laid before the
States-General. To this end, in truth, Richardot and his colleagues had
long been secretly tending. Moreover, the subject had been thoroughly
but secretly discussed long before between Jeannin and Barneveld.
The French and English ambassadors, accordingly, on the 27th August,

came before the States-General, and made a formal proposition for the
opening of negotiations for a truce. They advised the adoption of this
course in the strongest manner. "Let the truce be made with you," they
said, "as with free States, over which the king and the archdukes have
no pretensions, with the understanding that, during the time of the truce
you are to have free commerce as well to the Indies as to Spain and the
obedient Netherlands, and to every part of the Spanish dominions; that
you are to retain all that you possess at present, and that such other
conditions are to be added as you may find it reasonable to impose.
During this period of leisure you will have time to put your affairs in
order, to pay your debts, and to reform your Government, and if you
remain united, the truce will change into an absolute peace."
Maurice was more indignant when the new scheme was brought to his
notice than he had ever been before, and used more violent language in
opposing a truce than he had been used to employ when striving against
a peace. To be treated with, as with a free State, and to receive
permission to trade with the outside world until the truce should expire,
seemed to him a sorry result for the republic to accept.
The state-council declared, by way of answer to the foreign
ambassadors, that the principal points and conditions which had been
solemnly fixed, before the States had consented to begin the
negotiations, had been disputed with infinite effrontery and
shamelessness by the enemy. The pure and perfect sovereignty
notoriously included religion and navigation to any part of the world;
and the republic would never consent to any discussion of truce unless
these points were confirmed beforehand with the Spanish king's
signature and seal.
This resolution of the council--a body which stood much under the
influence of the Nassaus--was adopted next day by the States-General,
and duly communicated to the friendly ambassadors.
The foreign commissioners, when apprised of this decision, begged for
six weeks' time; in order to be able to hear from Madrid.
Even the peace party was disgusted with this impertinence. Maurice
boiled over with wrath. The ambassadors recommended compliance
with. the proposal. Their advice was discussed in the States-General,
eighty members being present, besides Maurice and Lewis William.
The stadholder made a violent and indignant speech.

He was justified in