Handbook of Home Rule | Page 7

in
inducing the various States to adopt it, or the magnitude and variety of
the fears and suspicions with which, many of the most influential men
in all parts of the country regarded it. Any one who wishes to know
how numerous and diversified these fears and suspicions were, cannot
do better than read the series of papers known as "The Federalist,"
written mainly by Hamilton and Madison, to commend the new plan to
the various States. It was adopted almost as a matter of necessity, that
is, as the only way out of the Slough of Despond in which the
Confederation had plunged the union of the States; but the objections to
it which were felt at the beginning were only removed by actual trial.
Hamilton's two colleagues, as delegates from New York, Yates and
Lansing, withdrew in disgust from the Convention, as soon as the
Constitution was outlined, and did not return. The notion that the
Constitution was produced by the craving of the American people for
something of that sort to love and revere, and that it was not bestowed
on them until they had given ample assurance that they would lavish
affection on it, has no foundation whatever in fact. The devotion of
Americans to the Union is, indeed, as clear a case of cause and effect as
is to be found in political history. They have learned to like the
Constitution because the country has prospered under it, and because it
has given them all the benefits of national life without interference with
local liberties. If they had not set up a central government until the
centrifugal sentiment had disappeared from the States, and the feeling
of loyalty for a central authority had fully shown itself, they would
assuredly never have set it up at all.

Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that the adoption of the
Constitution did not involve the surrender of any local franchises, by
which the people of the various States set great store. The States
preserved fully four-fifths of their autonomy, or in fact nearly all of it
which closely concerned the daily lives of individuals. Set aside the
post-office, and a citizen of the State of New York, not engaged in
foreign trade, might, down to the outbreak of the Civil War, have
passed a long and busy life without once coming in contact with a
United States official, and without being made aware in any of his
doings, by any restriction or regulation, that he was living under any
government but that of his own State. If he went abroad he had to apply
for a United States passport. If he quarrelled with a foreigner, or with
the citizen of another State, he might be sued in the Federal Court. If he
imported foreign goods he had to pay duties to the collector of a
Federal Custom-house. If he invented something, or wrote a book, he
had to apply to the Department of the Interior for a patent or a
copyright. But how few there were in the first seventy years of
American history who had any of these experiences! No one supposes,
or has ever supposed, that had the Federalists demanded any very large
sacrifice of local franchises, or attempted to set up even a close
approach to a centralized Government, the adoption of the Constitution
would have been possible. If, for instance, such a transfer of both
administration and legislation to the central authority as took place in
Ireland after the Union had been proposed, it would have been rejected
with derision. You will get no American to argue with you on this point.
If you ask him whether he thinks it likely that a highly centralized
government could have been created in 1879--such a one, for example,
as Ireland has been under since 1800--or whether if created it would by
this time have won the affection of the people, or filled them with
centripetal tendencies, he will answer you with a smile.
The truth is that nowhere, any more than in Ireland, do people love
their Government from a sense of duty or because they crave an object
of political affection, or even because it exalts them in the eyes of
foreigners. They love it because they are happy or prosperous under it;
because it supplies security in the form best suited to their tastes and
habits, or in some manner ministers to their self-love. Loyalty to the

king as the Lord's anointed, without any sense either of favours
received or expected, has played a great part in European politics, I
admit; but, for reasons which I will not here take up space in stating, a
political arrangement, whether it be an elected monarch or a
constitution, cannot be made, in our day, to reign