Great Britain and the American Civil War | Page 8

by the British Government,
Pakenham was sent to Washington to watch events, a chargé, Elliot,
was despatched to Texas, and from London lines were cast to draw
France into the plan and to force the acquiescence of Mexico.
In this brief account of main lines of governmental contacts, it is
unnecessary to recite the details of the diplomatic conflict, for such it
became, with sharp antagonisms manifested on both sides. The basic
fact was that America was bent upon territorial expansion, and that
Great Britain set herself to thwart this ambition. But not to the point of
war. Aberdeen was so incautious at one moment as to propose to
France and Mexico a triple guarantee of the independence of Texas, if
that state would acquiesce, but when Pakenham notified him that in this
case, Britain must clearly understand that war with America was not
merely possible, but probable, Aberdeen hastened to withdraw the plan
of guarantee, fortunately not yet approved by Mexico[9].
The solution of this diplomatic contest thus rested with Texas. Did she
wish annexation to the United States, or did she prefer independence?
Elliot, in Texas, hoped to the last moment that Texas would choose
independence and British favour. But the people of the new state were
largely emigrants from the United States, and a majority of them
wished to re-enter the Union, a step finally accomplished in 1846, after
ten years of separate existence as a Republic. The part played by the
British Government in this whole episode was not a fortunate one. It is
the duty of Governments to watch over the interests of their subjects,
and to guard the prestige and power of the state. Great Britain had a
perfect right to take whatever steps she chose to take in regard to Texas,
but the steps taken appeared to Americans to be based upon a policy
antagonistic to the American expansion policy of the moment. The
Government of Great Britain appeared, indeed, to have adopted a
policy of preventing the development of the power of the United States.
Then, fronted with war, she had meekly withdrawn. The basic British
public feeling, fixing the limits of governmental policy, of never again

being drawn into war with America, not because of fear, but because of
important trade relations and also because of essential liking and
admiration, in spite of surface antagonisms, was not appreciated in
America. Lord Aberdeen indeed, and others in governmental circles,
pleaded that the support of Texan independence was in reality perfectly
in harmony with the best interests of the United States, since it would
have tended toward the limitation of American slavery. And in the
matter of national power, they consoled themselves with prophecies
that the American Union, now so swollen in size, must inevitably split
into two, perhaps three, rival empires, a slave-holding one in the South,
free nations in North and West.
The fate of Texas sealed, Britain soon definitely abandoned all
opposition to American expansion unless it were to be attempted
northwards, though prophesying evil for the American madness.
Mexico, relying on past favours, and because of a sharp controversy
between the United States and Great Britain over the Oregon territory,
expected British aid in her war of 1846 against America. But she was
sharply warned that such aid would not be given, and the Oregon
dispute was settled in the Anglo-Saxon fashion of vigorous legal
argument, followed by a fair compromise. The Mexican war resulted in
the acquisition of California by the United States. British agents in this
province of Mexico, and British admirals on the Pacific were cautioned
to take no active steps in opposition.
Thus British policy, after Texan annexation, offered no barrier to
American expansion, and much to British relief the fear of the
extension of the American plans to Mexico and Central America was
not realized. The United States was soon plunged, as British statesmen
had prophesied, into internal conflict over the question whether the
newly-acquired territories should be slave or free.
The acquisition of California brought up a new problem of quick transit
between Atlantic and Pacific, and a canal was planned across Central
America. Here Britain and America acted together, at first in amity,
though the convention signed in 1850 later developed discord as to the
British claim of a protectorate over the Atlantic end of the proposed

canal at San Juan del Nicaragua. But Britain was again at war in
Europe in the middle 'fifties, and America was deep in quarrel over
slavery at home. On both sides in spite of much diplomatic intrigue and
of manifestations of national pride there was governmental desire to
avoid difficulties. At the end of the ten-year period Britain ceded to
Nicaragua her protectorate in the canal zone, and all causes of friction,
so reported President Buchanan to