Great Britain and the American Civil War | Page 7

America to restore to Spain her
revolted colonies, there developed in Great Britain a policy, seemingly
about to draw America and England into closer co-operation. Canning,
for Britain, proposed to America a joint declaration against French
intervention in the Americas. His argument was against the principle of

intervention; his immediate motive was a fear of French colonial
expansion; but his ultimate object was inheritance by Britain of Spain's
dying influence and position in the new world.
Canning's overture was earnestly considered in America. The
ex-Presidents, Jefferson and Madison, recommended its acceptance, but
the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, opposed this, favouring
rather a separate declaration by the United States, and of this opinion
was also President Monroe. Thus arose the Monroe Doctrine
announcing American opposition to the principle of "intervention," and
declaring that the American continents were no longer to be regarded as
open to further colonization by European nations. The British
emergency situation with France, though already quieted, caused
Monroe's Message to be greeted in England with high approval. But
Canning did not so approve it for he saw clearly that the Monroe
Doctrine was a challenge not merely to continental Europe, but to
England as well and he set himself to thwart this threatening American
policy. Had Canning's policy been followed by later British statesmen
there would have resulted a serious clash with the United States[8].
In fact the Monroe Doctrine, imposing on Europe a self-denying policy
of non-colonial expansion toward the west, provided for the United
States the medium, if she wished to use it, for her own expansion in
territory and in influence. But for a time there was no need of
additional territory for that already hers stretched from the Atlantic to
the Rocky Mountains, two-thirds of the way from ocean to ocean. Her
population was growing fast. But four millions at the time of the
Revolution, there were thirteen millions in 1830, and of these nearly a
third were already across the Appalachian range and were constantly
pressing on towards new lands in the South and West. The Monroe
Doctrine was the first definite notice given to Europe of America's
preconceived "destiny," but the earlier realization of that destiny took
place on lines of expansion within her own boundaries. To this there
could be no governmental objection, whether by Great Britain or any
other nation.
But when in the decade 1840 to 1850, the United States, to the view of

British statesmen, suddenly startled the world by entering upon a policy
of further territorial expansion, forsaking her peaceful progress and
turning toward war, there was a quick determination on a line of British
policy as regards the American advance. The first intimation of the new
American policy came in relation to the State of Texas which had
revolted from Mexico in 1836, and whose independence had been
generally recognized by 1842. To this new state Britain sent diplomatic
and consular agents and these reported two factions among the
people--one seeking admission to the American Union, one desiring the
maintenance of independence.
In 1841 Aberdeen had sent Lord Ashburton to America with
instructions to secure, if possible, a settlement of all matters in dispute.
Here was a genuine British effort to escape from national irritations.
But before the Treaty of 1842 was signed, even while it was in the
earlier stages of negotiation, the British Government saw, with alarm,
quite new questions arising, preventing, to its view, that harmonious
relation with the United States the desire for which had led to the
Ashburton mission. This new development was the appearance of an
American fever for territorial expansion, turning first toward Texas, but
soon voiced as a "manifest destiny" which should carry American
power and institutions to the Pacific and even into Central America.
Among these institutions was that of slavery, detested by the public of
Great Britain, yet a delicate matter for governmental consideration
since the great cotton manufacturing interests drew the bulk of their
supplies of raw cotton from the slave-holding states of America. If
Texas, herself a cotton state, should join the United States, dependence
upon slave-grown cotton would be intensified. Also, Texas, once
acquired, what was there to prevent further American exploitation,
followed by slave expansion, into Mexico, where for long British
influence had been dominant?
On the fate of Texas, therefore, centred for a time the whole British
policy toward America. Pakenham, the British minister to Mexico,
urged a British pressure on Mexico to forgo her plans of reconquering
Texas, and strong British efforts to encourage Texas in maintaining her
independence. His theory foreshadowed a powerful buffer

Anglo-Saxon state, prohibiting American advance to the south-west,
releasing Britain from dependence on American cotton, and ultimately,
he hoped, leading Texas to abolish slavery, not yet so rooted as to be
ineradicable. This policy was approved