From October to Brest-Litovsk | Page 5

in this declaration those results which later
came to be known collectively under the name of "Kornilovism." We
believed that the greatest danger threatened the revolution in either
case--whether the drive proved successful, which we did not expect, or
met with failure, which seemed to us almost inevitable. A successful
military advance would have united the middle class and the
bourgeoisie in their common chauvinistic tendencies, thus isolating the
revolutionary proletariat. An unsuccessful drive was likely to
demoralize the army completely, to involve a general retreat and the
loss of much additional territory, and to bring disgust and
disappointment to the people. Events took the latter course. The news
of victory did not last long. It was soon replaced by gloomy reports of
the refusal of many regiments to support the advancing columns, of the
great losses in commanding officers, who sometimes composed the
whole of the attacking units, etc. In view of its great historical
significance, we append an extract from the document issued by our
party in the All-Russian Council of Soviets on the 3rd of June, 1917,
just two weeks before the drive.
* * * * *
"We deem it necessary to present, as the first order of the day, a
question on whose solution depend not only all the other measures to
be adopted by the Council, but actually and literally the fate of the
whole Russian revolution the question of the military drive which is
being planned for the immediate future.
"Having put the people and the army, which does not know in the name
of what international ends it is called upon to shed its blood, face to
face with the impending attack (with all its consequences), the
counter-revolutionary circles of Russia are counting on the fact that this
drive will necessitate a concentration of power in the hands of the
military, diplomatic, and capitalistic groups affiliated with English,
French and American imperialism, and thus free them from the
necessity of reckoning later with the organized will of Russian

democracy.
"The secret counter-revolutionary instigators of the drive, who do not
stop short even of military adventurism, are consciously trying to play
on the demoralization in the army, brought about by the internal and
international situation of the country, and to this end are inspiring the
discouraged elements with the fallacious idea that the very fact of a
drive can rehabilitate the army--and by this mechanical means hide the
lack of a definite program for liquidating the war. At the same time, it
is clear that such an advance cannot but completely disorganize the
army by setting up its various units one against the other."
* * * * *
The military events were developing amid ever increasing difficulties
in the internal life of the nation. With regard to the land question,
industrial life, and national relations, the coalition government did not
take a single resolute step forward. The food and transportation
situations were becoming more and more disorganized. Local clashes
were growing more frequent. The "Socialistic" ministers were
exhorting the masses to be patient. All decisions and measures,
including the calling of the Constituent Assembly, were being
postponed. The insolvency and the instability of the coalition regime
were obvious.
There were two possible ways out: to drive the bourgeoisie out of
power and promote the aims of the revolution, or to adopt the policy of
"bridling" the people by resorting to repressive measures. Kerensky and
Tseretelli clung to a middle course and only muddled matters the more.
When the Cadets, the wiser and more far-sighted leaders of the
coalition government, understood that the unsuccessful military
advance of June 18th might deal a blow not only to the revolution, but
also to the government temporarily, they threw the whole weight of
responsibility upon their allies to the left.
On the 2nd of July came a crisis in the ministry, the immediate cause of
which was the Ukrainian question.
This was in every respect a period of most intense political suspense.
From various points at the front came delegates and private individuals,
telling of the chaos which reigned in the army as a result of the advance.
The so-called government press demanded severe repressions. Such
demands frequently came from the so-called Socialistic papers, also

Kerensky, more and more openly, went over to the side of the Cadets
and the Cadet generals, who had manifested not only their hatred of
revolution, but also their bitter enmity toward revolutionary parties in
general. The allied ambassadors were pressing the government with the
demand that army discipline be restored and the advance continued.
The greatest panic prevailed in government circles, while among the
workingmen much discontent had accumulated, which craved for
outward expression. "Avail yourselves of the resignations of the Cadet
ministers and take all the power into your own hands!"