From October to Brest-Litovsk | Page 4

day for an armed
demonstration at Petrograd. Its immediate purpose was to influence the
All-Russian Council of Soviets. "Take the power into your own
hands"--is what the Petrograd workingman wanted to say plainly to the
Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki. "Sever relations with the
bourgeoisie, give up the idea of coalition, and take the power into your
own hands." To us it was clear that the break between the
Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki on the one hand, and the
liberal bourgeoisie on the other, would compel the former to seek the
support of the more determined, advanced organization of the
proletariat, which would thus be assured of playing a leading role. And
this is exactly what frightened the middle-class leaders. Together with
the Government, in which they had their representatives, and hand in
hand with the liberal and counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, they began
a furious and insane campaign against the proposed demonstration, as
soon as they heard of it. All their forces were marshalled against us. We
had an insignificant minority in the Council and withdrew. The
demonstration did not take place.
But this frustrated demonstration left the deepest bitterness in the minds
of the two opposing forces, widened the breach and intensified their
hatred. At a secret conference of the Executive Committee of the
Council, in which representatives of the minority participated,
Tseretelli, then minister of the coalition government, with all the
arrogance of a narrow-minded middle-class doctrinaire, said that the
only danger threatening the revolution was the Bolsheviki and the
Petrograd proletariat armed by them. From this he concluded that it was
necessary to disarm the people, who "did not know how to handle
fire-arms." This referred to the workingmen and to those parts of the
Petrograd garrison who were with our party. However, the disarming
did not take place. For such a sharp measure the political and
psychological conditions were not yet quite ripe.
To afford the masses some compensation for the demonstration they
had missed, the Council of Soviets called a general unarmed
demonstration for the 18th of June. But it was just this very day that
marked the political triumph of our party. The masses poured into the
streets in mighty columns; and, despite the fact that they were called

out by the official Soviet organization, to counteract our intended
demonstration of the 10th of June, the workingmen and soldiers had
inscribed on their banners and placards the slogans of our party: "Down
with secret treaties," "Down with political drives," "Long live a just
peace!" "Down with the ten capitalistic ministers," and "All power to
the Soviets." Of placards expressing confidence in the coalition
government there were but three one from a cossack regiment, another
from the Plekhanov group, and the third from the Petrograd
organization of the Bund, composed mostly of non-proletarian
elements. This demonstration showed not only to our enemies, but also
to ourselves as well that we were much stronger in Petrograd than was
generally supposed.

THE DRIVE OF JUNE 18TH
A governmental crisis, as a result of the demonstration by these
revolutionary bodies, appeared absolutely inevitable. But the
impression produced by the demonstration was lost as soon as it was
reported from the front that the revolutionary army had advanced to
attack the enemy. On the very day that the workingmen and the
Petrograd garrison demanded the publication of the secret treaties and
an open offer of peace, Kerensky flung the revolutionary troops into
battle. This was no mere coincidence, to be sure. The projectors had
everything prepared in advance, and the time of attack was determined
not by military but by political considerations.
On the 19th of June, there was a so-called patriotic demonstration in
the streets of Petrograd. The Nevsky Prospect, the chief artery of the
bourgeoisie, was studded with excited groups, in which army officers,
journalists and well-dressed ladies were carrying on a bitter campaign
against the Bolsheviki. The first reports of the military drive were
favorable. The leading liberal papers considered that the principal aim
had been attained, that the drive of June 18, regardless of its ultimate
military results, would deal a mortal blow to the revolution, restore the
army's former discipline, and assure the liberal bourgeoisie of a
commanding position in the affairs of the government.
We, however, indicated to the bourgeoisie a different line of future
events. In a special declaration which we made in the Soviet Council a
few days before the drive, we declared that the military advance would

inevitably destroy all the internal ties within the army, set up its various
parts one against the other and turn the scales heavily in favor of the
counter-revolutionary elements, since it would be impossible to
maintain discipline in a demoralized army--an army devoid of
controlling ideas--without recourse to severe repressive measures. In
other words, we foretold