From Isolation to Leadership, Revised | Page 4

high grounds: and having formed and cemented together a power which may render reinforcement of her settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon, which shall be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and American nations. This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us, as necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on its necessary effect."
Monroe was later sent to Paris to support Livingston and he was instructed, in case there was no prospect of a favorable termination of the negotiations, to avoid a rupture until the spring and "in the meantime enter into conferences with the British Government, through their ambassador at Paris, to fix principles of alliance, and leave us in peace until Congress meets." Jefferson had already informed the British minister at Washington that if France should, by closing the mouth of the Mississippi, force the United States to war, "they would throw away the scabbard." Monroe and Livingston were now instructed, in case they should become convinced that France meditated hostilities against the United States, to negotiate an alliance with England and to stipulate that neither party should make peace or truce without the consent of the other. Thus notwithstanding his French proclivities and his warning against "entangling alliances," the author of the immortal Declaration of Independence was ready and willing in this emergency to form an alliance with England. The unexpected cession of the entire province of Louisiana to the United States made the contemplated alliance with England unnecessary.
The United States was no more successful in its effort to remain neutral during the Napoleonic wars than it was during the late war, though the slow means of communication a hundred years ago caused the struggle for neutral rights to be drawn out for a much longer period of time. Neither England nor France regarded us as having any rights which they were bound to respect, and American commerce was fairly bombarded by French decrees and British orders in council. There was really not much more reason why we should have fought England than France, but as England's naval supremacy enabled her to interfere more effectually with our commerce on the sea and as this interference was accompanied by the practice of impressing American sailors into the British service, we finally declared war against her. No effort was made, however, to form an alliance or even to co?perate with Napoleon. The United States fought the War of 1812 without allies, and while we gained a number of single-ship actions and notable victories on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, we failed utterly in two campaigns to occupy Canada, and the final result of the conflict was that our national capitol was burned and our commerce absolutely swept from the seas. Jackson's victory at New Orleans, while gratifying to our pride, took place two weeks after the treaty of Ghent had been signed and had, consequently, no effect on the outcome of the war.

II
FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
The international situation which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine was the most unusual in some respects that modern history records. The European alliance which had been organized in 1813 for the purpose of bringing about the overthrow of Napoleon continued to dominate the affairs of Europe until 1823. This alliance, which met at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and held later meetings at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, at Troppau in 1820, at Laybach in 1821, and at Verona in 1822, undertook to legislate for all Europe and was the nearest approach to a world government that had ever been tried. While this alliance publicly proclaimed that it had no other object than the maintenance of peace and that the repose of the world was its motive and its end, its real object was to uphold absolute monarchy and to suppress every attempt at the establishment of representative government. As long as England remained in the alliance her statesmen exercised a restraining influence, for England was the only one of the allies which professed to have a representative system of government. As Castlereagh was setting out for the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle Lord Liverpool, who was then prime minister, warned him that, "The Russian must be made to feel that we have a parliament and a public, to which we are responsible, and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views of policy which are wholly incompatible with the spirit of our government."
The reactionary spirit of the continental members of the alliance was soon thoroughly aroused by the series of revolutions that followed