Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 | Page 4

taken up the best formation and order will be victor, because it is not
possible so to break up an order with wind and sea as that he who is
more without order shall not be worse broken up and the sooner
defeated. For ships at sea are as war-horses on land, since admitting
they are not very nimble at turning at any pace, nevertheless a regular
formation increases their power. Moreover, at sea, so long as there be

no storm, there will be nothing to hinder the using of any of the orders
with which we have dealt, and if there be a storm the same terror will
strike the one side as the other; for the storm is enough for all to war
with, and in fighting it they will have peace with one another.'
At first sight it would seem that De Chaves in this argument takes no
account of superiority of seamanship--the factor which was destined to
turn the scale against Spain upon the sea. But the following passage
with which he concludes shows that he regarded seamanship as the
controlling factor in every case. 'And if,' he argues, 'they say that the
enemy will take the same thought and care as I, I answer that when
both be equal in numbers and arms, then in such case he who shall be
more dexterous and have more spirit and fortitude he will conquer, the
which he will not do, although he have more and better arms and as
much spirit as he will, if he be wanting in good order and counsel. Just
as happens in fencing, that the weaker man if he be more dexterous
gives more and better hits than the other who does not understand the
beats nor knows them, although he be the stronger. And the same holds
good with any army whatsoever on land, and it has been seen that the
smaller by their good order have defeated the stronger.'
From the work in question Captain Fernandez Duro gives four sections
or chapters in Appendix 12 to the first volume of his history,[2] namely,
1. 'Of war or battle at sea,' relating to single ship actions. 2. 'The form
of a battle and the method of fighting,' relating to armament, fire
discipline, boarding and the like. 3. 'Of a battle of one fleet against
another.' 4. 'Battle.' In the last two sections is contained the earliest
known attempt to formulate a definite fighting formation and tactical
system for sailing fleets, and it is from these that the following extracts
have been translated.
It will be noted that in the root-idea of coming as quickly as possible to
close quarters, and in relying mainly on end-on fire, the proposed
system is still quite mediæval and founded mainly upon galley tactics.
But a new and advanced note is struck in the author's insistence on the
captain-general's keeping out of action as long as possible, instead of
leading the attack in the time-honoured way. We should also remark

the differentiation of types, for all of which a duty was provided in
action. This was also a survival of galley warfare, and rapidly
disappeared with the advance of the sailing man-of-war, never to be
revived, unless perhaps it be returning in the immediate future, and we
are to see torpedo craft of the latest devising taking the place and
function of the barcas, with their axes and augers, and armoured
cruisers those of the naos de succurro.

_ESPEJO DE NAVEGANTES, circa_ 1530.
[+Fernandez Duro, Armada Española i. App. 12+.]
_Chapter III.--Of a Battle between One Fleet and Another_.
[Extract.]
... When the time for battle is at hand the captain-general should order
the whole fleet to come together that he may set them in order, since a
regular order is no less necessary in a fleet of ships for giving battle to
another fleet than it is in an army of soldiers for giving battle to another
army.
Thus, as in an army, the men-at-arms form by themselves in one
quarter to make and meet charges, and the light horse in another quarter
to support, pursue, and harass[3] so in a fleet, the captain-general ought
to order the strongest and largest ships to form in one quarter to attack,
grapple, board and break-up the enemy, and the lesser and weaker ships
in another quarter apart, with their artillery and munitions to harass,
pursue, and give chase to the enemy if he flies, and to come to the
rescue wherever there is most need.
The captain-general should form a detachment of his smaller and
lighter vessels, to the extent of one-fourth part of his whole fleet, and
order them to take station on either side of the main body. I mean that
they should always keep as