Euthyphro | Page 9

very much like.
EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and
impiety is that which is not dear to them.
SOCRATES: Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort
of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I
cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the
truth of your words.
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That
thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or
person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the

extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?
EUTHYPHRO: It was.
SOCRATES: And well said?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.
SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have
enmities and hatreds and differences?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, that was also said.
SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger?
Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a
number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at
variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put
an end to them by a sum?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not
quickly end the differences by measuring?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by
resorting to a weighing machine?
EUTHYPHRO: To be sure.
SOCRATES: But what differences are there which cannot be thus
decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with
one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment,
and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters
of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and
dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and
about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences,
you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel? (Compare Alcib.)

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about
which we quarrel is such as you describe.
SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when
they occur, are of a like nature?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly they are.
SOCRATES: They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good
and evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would
have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such
differences--would there now?
EUTHYPHRO: You are quite right.
SOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and
just and good, and hate the opposite of them?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as
just and others as unjust,--about these they dispute; and so there arise
wars and fightings among them.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by
the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be
pious and also impious?
EUTHYPHRO: So I should suppose.
SOCRATES: Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not
answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to
tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem

that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore,
Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing
what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and
what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there
may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.
EUTHYPHRO: But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be
agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no
difference of opinion about that.
SOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear
any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let
off?
EUTHYPHRO: I should rather say that these are the questions which
they are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all
sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in
their own defence.
SOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that
they ought not to be punished?
EUTHYPHRO: No; they do not.
SOCRATES: Then there are some things which they do not venture to
say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be
unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should