Euthyphro | Page 8

young, but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs,
and of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if
Meletus refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the
indictment from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat this challenge
in the court.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I
am mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great
deal more to say to him than to me.
SOCRATES: And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of
becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice
you--not even this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at
once, and he has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to
tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew
so well, and of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What
are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety,
again--is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with
itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is
impious?
EUTHYPHRO: To be sure, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting
any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar

crime--whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may
be--that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And
please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the
truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others:--of the
principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go
unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous
of the gods?--and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos)
because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished
his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner.
And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So
inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are
concerned, and when I am concerned.
SOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged
with impiety--that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and
therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are
well informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than
assent to your superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I do,
that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether
you really believe that they are true.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of
which the world is in ignorance.
SOCRATES: And do you really believe that the gods fought with one
another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say,
and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? The
temples are full of them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is
carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered
with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if
you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which
would quite amaze you.
SOCRATES: I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time
when I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a
more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the

question, What is 'piety'? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you
do, charging your father with murder.
EUTHYPHRO: And what I said was true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are
many other pious acts?
EUTHYPHRO: There are.
SOCRATES: Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three
examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all
pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea
which made the impious impious, and the pious pious?
EUTHYPHRO: I remember.
SOCRATES: Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall
have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure
actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able
to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.
EUTHYPHRO: I will tell you, if you like.
SOCRATES: I should