Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius | Page 3

That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War
XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has reputation rather than strength
XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it
XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than by Force
XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility
XV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that tardy resolves are always hurtful
XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient Warfare
XVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just
XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse
XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to their aggrandizement
XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms
XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Pr?tor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war
XXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss
XXIII. That in chastising then Subjects when circumstances required it the Romans always avoided half measures
XXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good
XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think to get possession of it through its divisions
XXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them, without yielding him any advantage
XXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a victory; for, commonly, when they are not, their victory turns to defeat
XXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth
XXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have them hinder her designs
XXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with money, but with their valour and the fame of then prowess
XXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men
XXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession of Towns
XXXIII. That the Romans entrusted the Captains of their Armies with the fullest Powers
BOOK III.
I. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought back to its beginnings
II. That on occasion it is wise to feign folly
III. That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the Sons of Brutus
IV. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom he has deprived of it
V. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom
VI. Of Conspiracies
VII. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other times reek with blood
VIII. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed to its character and condition
IX. That to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times
X. That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy forces it on him at all hazards
XI. That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset
XII. A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity
XIII. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain
XIV. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights or Sounds
XV. That one and not many should head an Army; and why it is disadvantageous to have more leaders than one
XVI. That in times of difficulty true Worth is sought after whereas in quiet times it is not the most deserving but those who are recommended by wealth or connection who are most in favour
XVII. That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an important Office or Command
XVIII. That it is the highest quality of a Captain to be able to forestall the designs of his adversary
XIX. Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a Multitude
XX. How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii than all the might of the Roman Arms
XXI. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other achieved in Spain
XXII. That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory
XXIII. Why Camillus was banished from Rome
XXIV. That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude
XXV. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus