Discourse on the Method of Reasoning | Page 3

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The Project Gutenberg Etext of A Discourse on Method
DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING
THE REASON, AND SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES
by Rene Descartes

PREFATORY NOTE BY THE AUTHOR
If this Discourse appear too long to be read at once, it may be divided
into six Parts: and, in the first, will be found various considerations
touching the Sciences; in the second, the principal rules of the Method
which the Author has discovered, in the third, certain of the rules of
Morals which he has deduced from this Method; in the fourth, the
reasonings by which he establishes the existence of God and of the
Human Soul, which are the foundations of his Metaphysic; in the fifth,
the order of the Physical questions which he has investigated, and, in
particular, the explication of the motion of the heart and of some other
difficulties pertaining to Medicine, as also the difference between the
soul of man and that of the brutes; and, in the last, what the Author
believes to be required in order to greater advancement in the
investigation of Nature than has yet been made, with the reasons that
have induced him to write.

PART 1

Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed;
for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those
even who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not
usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess.
And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken the conviction is rather
to be held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of
distinguishing truth from error, which is properly what is called good
sense or reason, is by nature equal in all men; and that the diversity of
our opinions, consequently, does not arise from some being endowed
with a larger share of reason than others, but solely from this, that we
conduct our thoughts along different ways, and do not fix our attention
on the same objects. For to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not
enough; the prime requisite is rightly to apply it. The greatest minds, as
they are capable of the highest excellences, are open likewise to the
greatest aberrations; and those who travel very slowly may yet make far
greater progress, provided they keep always to the straight road, than
those who, while they run, forsake it.
For myself, I have never fancied my mind to be in any respect more
perfect than those of the generality; on the contrary, I have often
wished that I were equal to some others in promptitude of thought, or in
clearness and distinctness of imagination, or in fullness and readiness
of memory. And besides these, I know of no other qualities that
contribute to the perfection of the mind; for as to the reason or sense,
inasmuch as it is that alone which constitutes us men, and distinguishes
us from the brutes, I am disposed to believe that it is to be found
complete in each individual; and on this point to adopt the common
opinion of philosophers, who say that the difference of greater and less
holds only among the accidents, and not among the forms or natures of
individuals of the same species.
I will not hesitate, however, to avow my belief that it has been my
singular good fortune to have very early in life fallen in with certain
tracks which have conducted me to considerations and maxims, of
which I have formed a method that gives me the means, as I think, of
gradually augmenting my knowledge, and of raising it by little and
little to the highest point which the mediocrity of my talents and the

brief duration of my life will permit me to reach. For I have already
reaped from it such fruits that, although I have been accustomed to
think lowly enough of myself, and although when I look with the eye of
a philosopher at the varied courses and pursuits of mankind at large, I
find scarcely one which does not appear in vain and useless, I
nevertheless derive the highest satisfaction from the progress I conceive
myself to have already made in the search after truth, and cannot help
entertaining such expectations of the future as to believe that if, among
the occupations of men as men, there is any one really excellent and
important, it is that which I have chosen.
After all, it is possible I may be mistaken; and it is but a little copper
and glass, perhaps, that I take for gold and diamonds. I know how very
liable