Dios Rome, Vol. 4 | Page 5

no sensible man would desire to become supreme ruler. [-11-] If the fact that such rulers can enrich and preserve others and perform many other good deeds, and that, by Jupiter, they may also outrage others and injure whomsoever they please leads any one to think that tyranny is worth striving for, he is utterly mistaken. I need not tell you that to live licentiously and to do evil is base and hazardous and hated of both gods and men. You are not that sort of man, and it is not for these reasons that you would choose to be sole ruler. I have elected to speak now not of everything which one might accomplish who handled affairs badly, but of what even the very best are compelled to do and endure when they adopt the system. The other point,--that one may bestow abundant favors,--is worthy of zeal, to be sure: yet when this disposition is indulged in private capacity, it is noble, august, glorious, and safe, whereas in monarchies it is first of all not a sufficient offset to the other, more disagreeable matters, that any one should choose monarchy for this especially when one is to grant to others the benefit to be derived therefrom, and accept himself the unpleasantness involved in the rest of the conduct of the office.
[-12-] "In the next place, the matter is not simple, as people think. No one could render assistance enough to satisfy all who need help. Those who think they ought to receive some gift from the sovereign are practically all mankind, even though no favors can at once be seen to be due them. Every one naturally has his own approbation and wishes to enjoy some benefit from him who is able to give. But the presents which can be given them,--I mean honors and offices, and sometimes money,--can be counted quite easily as compared with so great a multitude. This being so, more hatred would fall to the monarch's lot from those who fail to get what they want than friendship from such as obtain their desires. The latter take what they regard as due to them and think there is no particular reason for being very thankful to the one who gives it, since they are getting no more than they expected. Moreover, they actually shrink from such behavior for fear they may appear in the light of persons undeserving of generous treatment. The others, who are disappointed of their hopes, are grieved for two causes. First, they feel that they are robbed of what belongs to them, for by nature all persons think that everything which they desire is their own: second, they feel as if they were finding themselves guilty of some wrong, if they show resignation at not obtaining what they expect. The man who gives such great gifts rightly of course investigates before all else each person's worth: some he honors, others he neglects. As a result, then, of his judgment, some are filled with pride and others with vexation by their own consciousness of its correctness. If any one were to wish to guard against this outcome and distribute his presents without system, he would fail utterly. The base, being honored contrary to their deserts, would become worse; for they would decide either that they were approved as being good or, if not so, that they were courted as dangerous persons: the excellent, on attaining no higher place than they, but held merely in equal honor with the base, would be more indignant at their reduction to the latter's level than the others would rejoice to be deemed valuable. Accordingly, they would give up the practice of better principles and strive to emulate less worthy men. Thus, even as a result of the very honors, those who bestow them would reap no benefit and those who receive them would become worse than before. So that this consideration, which would please some persons most in the monarchical constitution, has been proved to be a most difficult problem for you to deal with.
[-13-] "Reflecting on these facts and the rest which I mentioned a little earlier, be prudent while you may, and restore to the people the arms, the provinces, the offices, and the funds. If you do it at once and voluntarily, you will be the most famous of men and the most secure. But if you wait for some force to be applied, perhaps you might suffer some disaster together with ill repute. Here is evidence. Marius, Sulla, Metellus, and Pompey at first, when they got control of affairs, refused to become princes, and by this attitude escaped harm. Cinna, however, and Strabo,[2] the second Marius, Sertorius, and Pompey himself at a later date, through their desire for sovereignty perished miserably. It