Dios Rome, Vol. 4 | Page 3

democratic communities and were set free by our own selves.
[-6-] "To begin first with the smallest matter, it will be requisite that you procure a large supply of money from all sides. It is impossible that our present revenues should suffice for the very expenses, and particularly for the support of the soldiers. This need exists also in democracies, for it is not possible to organize any government without expense. But under such a system many give largely in addition to what is required, and do it frequently, making it a matter of rivalry and securing proper honors for their liberality. Or, if perchance there are compulsory levies upon everybody, they endure it because they can persuade themselves that it is wise and because they are contributing in their own behalf. Under sovereignties they think that the ruling power alone, to which they credit boundless wealth, should bear the expense: they are very ready to search out the ruler's sources of income, but do not make a similar careful calculation about the outgo. They are not inclined to pay out anything extra personally and of their own free will, nor will they hear of voluntary public contributions. The former course no one would choose, because he would not readily admit that he was rich, and it is not to the advantage of the ruler to have it happen. So liberal a citizen would immediately acquire a reputation for patriotism among the mass of the people, would become conceited, and cause a disturbance in politics. On the other hand, a general levy weighs heavily upon them all and chiefly because they endure the loss whereas others take the gain. In democracies those who contribute money as a general rule also serve in the army, so that in a way they get it back again. But in monarchies one set of people usually farm, manufacture, carry on maritime enterprises, engage in politics,--the principal pursuits by which fortunes are secured,--and a different set are under arms and draw pay.
"This single necessity, then, which is of such importance [-7-] will cause you trouble. Here is another. It is by all means essential that whoever from time to time commits a crime should pay some penalty. The majority of men are not brought to reason by suggestion or by example, but it is absolutely requisite to punish them by disenfranchisement, by exile, and by death; and this often happens in so great an empire and in so large a multitude of men, especially during a change of government. Now if you appointed other men to judge these wrongdoers, they would acquit them speedily, particularly all whom you may be thought to hate. For judges secure a pretended authority when they act in any way contrary to the wish of the ruling power. If, again, any are convicted, they will believe they have been condemned on account of instructions for which you are responsible. However, if you sit as judge yourself, you will be compelled to chastise many of the peers,--and this is not favorable,--and you will certainly be thought to be setting some of them right in anger rather than in justice. No one believes that those who have the power to use compulsion can execute judgment with justice, but everybody thinks that out of shame they spread out a mere phantom and rough picture of government in front of the truth, in order that under the legitimate name of court they may fulfill their desire. This is what happens in monarchies. In democracies, when any one is accused of committing a private wrong, he is made defendant in a private suit before judges who are his equals: or, if he is accused for a public crime, such a man has empaneled a jury of his peers, whoever the lot shall designate. It is easier for men to bear their decisions, since they do not think that any verdict rendered is due to the power of the judge or has been wrung from him as a favor.[1]
[-8-] "Then again there are many, apart from any criminals, some priding themselves on birth, others on wealth, others on something different, in general not bad men, who are by nature opposed to the conception of monarchy. If a ruler allows them to become strong, he cannot live in safety, and if he undertakes to impose a check on them, he cannot do so justly. What then shall he do with them? How shall he treat them? If you root out their families, diminish their wealth, humble their pride, you will lose the good-will of your subjects. How can it be otherwise, if no one is permitted to be born nobly or to grow rich honestly or to become strong, brave, or learned? But if you allow all the