substantive or adjective, including of
course pronouns and participles, are so, but only in their nominative
cases, except when an oblique case is so used as to be equivalent to an
attributive. Verbs also are categorematic, but only in three of their
moods, the Indicative, the Infinitive, and the Potential. The Imperative
and Optative moods clearly do not convey assertions at all, while the
Subjunctive can only figure as a subordinate member of some assertion.
We may notice, too, that the relative pronoun, unlike the rest, is
necessarily syncategorematic, for the same reason as the subjunctive
mood. Of the remaining parts of speech the article, adverb, preposition,
and conjunction can never be anything but syncategorematic, while the
interjection is acategorematic, like the vocative case of nouns and the
imperative and optative moods of verbs, which do not enter at all into
the form of sentence known as the proposition.].
§ 72. Categorematic literally means 'predicable.' 'Horse,' 'swift,'
'galloping' are categorematic. Thus we can say, 'The horse is swift,' or
'The horse is galloping.' Each of these words forms a term by itself, but
'over' and 'swiftly' can only help to form a term, as in the proposition,
'The horse is galloping swiftly over the plain.'
§ 73. A term then may be said to be a categorematic word or collection
of words, that is to say, one which can be used by itself as a predicate.
§ 74. To entitle a word or collection of words to be called a term, it is
not necessary that it should be capable of standing by itself as a subject.
Many terms which can be used as predicates are incapable of being
used as subjects: but every term which can be used as a subject (with
the doubtful exception of proper names) can be used also as a predicate.
The attributives 'swift' and 'galloping' are terms, quite as much as the
subject 'horse,' but they cannot themselves be used as subjects.
§ 75. When an attributive appears to be used as a subject, it is owing to
a grammatical ellipse. Thus in Latin we say 'Boni sapientes sunt,' and
in English 'The good are wise,' because it is sufficiently declared by the
inflexional form in the one case, and by the usage of the language in the
other, that men are signified. It is an accident of language how far
adjectives can be used as subjects. They cease to be logical attributives
the moment they are so used.
§ 76. There is a sense in which every word may become categorematic,
namely, when it is used simply as a word, to the neglect of its proper
meaning. Thus we can say--'"Swiftly" is an adverb.' 'Swiftly' in this
sense is really no more than the proper name for a particular word. This
sense is technically known as the 'suppositio materialis' of a word.
CHAPTER II.
Of the Division of Things.
§ 77. Before entering on the divisions of terms it is necessary to advert
for a moment to a division of the things whereof they are names.
§ 78. By a 'thing' is meant simply an object of thought--whatever one
can think about.
§ 79. Things are either Substances or Attributes. Attributes may be
sub-divided into Qualities and Relations.
Thing ______________|_____________ | | Substance Attribute
___________|__________ | | Quality Relation
§ 80. A Substance is a thing which can be conceived to exist by itself.
All bodies are material substances. The soul, as a thinking subject, is
an immaterial substance.
§ 81. An Attribute is a thing which depends for its existence upon a
substance, e.g. greenness, hardness, weight, which cannot be conceived
to exist apart from green, hard, and heavy substances.
§ 82. A Quality is an attribute which does not require more than one
substance for its existence. The attributes just mentioned are qualities.
There might be greenness, hardness, and weight, if there were only one
green, hard and heavy substance in the universe.
§ 83. A Relation is an attribute which requires two or more substances
for its existence, e.g. nearness, fatherhood, introduction.
§ 84. When we say that a substance can be conceived to exist by itself,
what is meant is that it can be conceived to exist independently of other
substances. We do not mean that substances can be conceived to exist
independently of attributes, nor yet out of relation to a mind perceiving
them. Substances, so far as we can know them, are only collections of
attributes. When therefore we say that substances can be conceived to
exist by themselves, whereas attributes are dependent for their
existence upon substances, the real meaning of the assertion reduces
itself to this, that it is only certain collections of attributes which can be
conceived to exist independently; whereas single attributes depend for
their
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