Darwiniana | Page 8

suggest a natural
connection than the contrary; and the contrary cannot be demonstrated
until the possibilities of Nature under the Deity are fathomed.
But, the intellectual connection being undoubted, Mr. Agassiz properly
refers the whole to "the agency of Intellect as its first cause." In doing
so, however, he is not supposed to be offering a scientific explanation
of the phenomena. Evidently he is considering only the ultimate why,
not the proximate why or how.
Now the latter is just what Mr. Darwin is considering. He conceives of
a physical connection between allied species; but we suppose he does

not deny their intellectual connection, as related to a supreme
intelligence. Certainly we see no reason why he should, and many
reasons why he should not, Indeed, as we contemplate the actual
direction of investigation and speculation in the physical and natural
sciences, we dimly apprehend a probable synthesis of these divergent
theories, and in it the ground for a strong stand against mere naturalism.
Even if the doctrine of the origin of species through natural selection
should prevail in our day, we shall not despair; being confident that the
genius of an Agassiz will be found equal to the work of constructing,
upon the mental and material foundations combined, a theory of Nature
as theistic and as scientific as that which he has so eloquently
expounded.
To conceive the possibility of "the descent of species from species by
insensibly fine gradations" during a long course of time, and to
demonstrate its compatibility with a strictly theistic view of the
universe, is one thing; to substantiate the theory itself or show its
likelihood is quite another thing. This brings us to consider what
Darwin's theory actually is, and how he supports it.
That the existing kinds of animals and plants, or many of them, may be
derived from other and earlier kinds, in the lapse of time, is by no
means a novel proposition. Not to speak of ancient speculations of the
sort, it is the well-known Lamarckian theory. The first difficulty which
such theories meet with is that in the present age, with all its own and
its inherited prejudgments, the whole burden of proof is naturally, and
indeed properly, laid upon the shoulders of the propounders; and thus
far the burden has been more than they could bear. From the very
nature of the case, substantive proof of specific creation is not
attainable; but that of derivation or transmutation of species may be. He
who affirms the latter view is bound to do one or both of two things: 1.
Either to assign real and adequate causes, the natural or necessary result
of which must be to produce the present diversity of species and their
actual relations; or, 2. To show the general conformity of the whole
body of facts to such assumption, and also to adduce instances
explicable by it and inexplicable by the received view, so perhaps
winning our assent to the doctrine, through its competency to
harmonize all the facts, even though the cause of the assumed variation
remain as occult as that of the transformation of tadpoles into frogs, or

that of Coryne into Sarzia.
The first line of proof, successfully carried out, would establish
derivation as a true physical theory; the second, as a sufficient
hypothesis.
Lamarck mainly undertook the first line, in a theory which has been so
assailed by ridicule that it rarely receives the credit for ability to which
in its day it was entitled, But he assigned partly unreal, partly
insufficient causes; and the attempt to account for a progressive change
in species through the direct influence of physical agencies, and
through the appetencies and habits of animals reacting upon their
structure, thus causing the production and the successive modification
of organs, is a conceded and total failure. The shadowy author of the
"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation" can hardly be said to have
undertaken either line, in a scientific way. He would explain the whole
progressive evolution of Nature by virtue of an inherent tendency to
development, thus giving us an idea or a word in place of a natural
cause, a restatement of the proposition instead of an explanation. Mr.
Darwin attempts both lines of proof, and in a strictly scientific spirit;
but the stress falls mainly upon the first, for, as he does assign real
causes, he is bound to prove their adequacy.
It should be kept in mind that, while all direct proof of independent
origination is attainable from the nature of the case, the overthrow of
particular schemes of derivation has not established the opposite
proposition. The futility of each hypothesis thus far proposed to
account for derivation may be made apparent, or unanswerable
objections may be urged against it; and each victory of the