Darwiniana | Page 7

diversified types under
identical circumstances . . . the repetition of similar types under the
most diversified circumstances . . . the unity of plan in otherwise
highly-diversified types of animals . . . the correspondence, now
generally known as special homologies, in the details of structure
otherwise entirely disconnected, down to the most minute

peculiarities . . . the various degrees and different kinds of relationship
among animals which (apparently) can have no genealogical
connection . . . the simultaneous existence in the earliest geological
periods, . . . of representatives of all the great types of the animal
kingdom . . . the gradation based upon complications of structure which
may be traced among animals built upon the same plan; the distribution
of some types over the most extensive range of surface of the globe,
while others are limited to particular geographical areas . . . the identity
of structures of these types, notwithstanding their wide geographical
distribution . . . the community of structure in certain respects of
animals otherwise entirely different, but living within the same
geographical area . . . the connection by series of special structures
observed in animals widely scattered over the surface of the globe . . .
the definite relations in which animals stand to the surrounding
world, . . . the relations in which individuals of the same species stand
to one another . . . the limitation of the range of changes which animals
undergo during their growth . . . the return to a definite norm of animals
which multiply in various ways . . . the order of succession of the
different types of animals and plants characteristic of the different
geological epochs, . . . the localization of some types of animals upon
the same points of the surface of the globe during several successive
geological periods . . . the parallelism between the order of succession
of animals and plants in geological times, and the gradation among
their living representatives . . . the parallelism between the order of
succession of animals in geological times and the changes their living
representatives undergo during their embryological growth, [I-5] . . .
the combination in many extinct types of characters which in later ages
appear disconnected in different types, . . . the parallelism between the
gradation among animals and the changes they undergo during their
growth, . . . the relations existing between these different series and the
geographical distribution of animals, . . . the connection of all the
known features of Nature into one system--"
In a word, the whole relations of animals, etc., to surrounding Nature
and to each other, are regarded under the one view as ultimate facts, or
in the ultimate aspect, and interpreted theologically; under the other as
complex facts, to be analyzed and interpreted scientifically. The one
naturalist, perhaps too largely assuming the scientifically unexplained

to be inexplicable, views the phenomena only in their supposed relation
to the Divine mind. The other, naturally expecting many of these
phenomena to be resolvable under investigation, views them in their
relations to one another, and endeavors to explain them as far as he can
(and perhaps farther) through natural causes.
But does the one really exclude the other? Does the investigation of
physical causes stand opposed to the theological view and the study of
the harmonies between mind and Nature? More than this, is it not most
presumable that an intellectual conception realized in Nature would be
realized through natural agencies? Mr. Agassiz answers these questions
affirmatively when he declares that "the task of science is to investigate
what has been done, to inquire if possible how it has been done, rather
than to ask what is possible for the Deity, since we can know that only
by what actually exists;" and also when he extends the argument for the
intervention in Nature of a creative mind to its legitimate application in
the inorganic world; which, he remarks, "considered in the same light,
would not fail also to exhibit unexpected evidence of thought, in the
character of the laws regulating the chemical combinations, the action
of physical forces, etc., etc." [I-6] Mr. Agassiz, however, pronounces
that "the connection between the facts is only intellectual"--an opinion
which the analogy of the inorganic world, just referred to, does not
confirm, for there a material connection between the facts is justly held
to be consistent with an intellectual--and which the most analogous
cases we can think of in the organic world do not favor; for there is a
material connection between the grub, the pupa, and the butterfly,
between the tadpole and the frog, or, still better, between those distinct
animals which succeed each other in alternate and very dissimilar
generations. So that mere analogy might rather