among the kingdoms of Europe rose from feudal chaos to
orderly nationalism; it was France that first among continental
countries after the Middle Ages established the reign of law throughout
a powerful realm. Though wars and turmoils almost without end were a
heavy drain upon Gallic vitality for many generations, France achieved
steady progress to primacy in the arts of peace. None but a marvellous
people could have made such efforts without exhaustion, yet even now
in the twentieth century the astounding vigor of this race has not ceased
to compel the admiration of mankind.
In the seventeenth century, moreover, France owed much of her
national power to a highly-centralized and closely-knit scheme of
government. Under Richelieu the strength of the monarchy had been
enhanced and the power of the nobility broken. When he began his
personal rule, Louis XIV continued his work of consolidation and in
the years of his long reign managed to centralize in the throne every
vestige of political power. The famous saying attributed to him, "The
State! I am the State!" embodied no idle boast. Nowhere was there a
trace of representative government, nowhere a constitutional check on
the royal power. There were councils of different sorts and with varied
jurisdictions, but men sat in them at the King's behest and were
removable at his will. There were _parlements_, too, but to mention
them without explanation would be only to let the term mislead, for
they were not representative bodies or parliaments in the ordinary sense:
their powers were chiefly judicial and they were no barrier in the way
of the steady march to absolutism. The political structure of the
Bourbon realm in the age of Louis XIV and afterwards was simple: all
the lines of control ran upwards and to a common center. And all this
made for unity and autocratic efficiency in finance, in war, and in
foreign affairs.
Another feature which fitted the nation for an imperial destiny was the
possession of a united and militant church. With heresy the Gallican
branch of the Catholic Church had fought a fierce struggle, but, before
the seventeenth century was far advanced, the battle had been won.
There were heretics in France even after Richelieu's time, but they were
no longer a source of serious discord. The Church, now victorious over
its foes, became militant, ready to carry its missionary efforts to other
lands--ready, in fact, for a new crusade.
These four factors, rare geographical advantages, racial qualities of a
high order, a strongly centralized scheme of government, and a militant
church, contributed largely to the prestige which France possessed
among European nations in the seventeenth, century. With all these
advantages she should have been the first and not the last to get a firm
footing in the new continents. Historians have recorded their reasons
why France did not seriously enter the field of American colonization
as early as England, but these reasons do not impress one as being good.
Foreign wars and internal religious strife are commonly given and
accepted as the true cause of French tardiness in following up the
pioneer work of Jacques Cartier and others. Yet not all the energy of
nearly twenty million people was being absorbed in these troubles.
There were men and money to spare, had the importance of the work
overseas only been adequately realized.
The main reason why France was last in the field is to be found in the
failure of her kings and ministers to realize until late in the day how
vast the possibilities of the new continent really were. In a highly
centralized and not over-populated state the authorities must lead the
way in colonial enterprises; the people will not of their own initiative
seek out and follow opportunities to colonize distant lands. And in
France the authorities were not ready to lead. Sully, who stood supreme
among the royal advisers in the closing years of the sixteenth century,
was opposed to colonial ventures under all circumstances. "Far-off
possessions," he declared, "are not suited to the temperament or to the
genius of Frenchmen, who to my great regret have neither the
perseverance nor the foresight needed for such enterprises, but who
ordinarily apply their vigor, minds, and courage to things which are
immediately at hand and constantly before their eyes." Colonies beyond
the seas, he believed, "would never be anything but a great expense."
That, indeed, was the orthodox notion in circles surrounding the seat of
royal power, and it was a difficult notion to dislodge.
Never until the time of Richelieu was any intimation of the great
colonial opportunity, now quickly slipping by, allowed to reach the
throne, and then it was only an inkling, making but a slight impression
and soon virtually forgotten. Richelieu's great Company of 1627 made
a brave start,
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