CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 7

Santiago. The contact
requested three submachine-guns and tear-gas grenades. Despite
puzzlement over the need for these items, CIA Headquarters authorized
Santiago to fill the request--they were delivered at 0200 hours on 22
October. [62]
Officers in Washington were not fully aware of the provenance of the
Valenzuela plot. CIA Headquarters had several questions: a. What
happened between morning 17 October and evening 17 October to
change [deleted] from despondency to measured optimism? b. Who
exactly is involved in coup attempt? [63]
As it turned out, the Valenzuela plot was almost the same as Viaux's
plan, which had been disclosed to the CIA on 14 October. Schneider
would be kidnapped when leaving a stag party the evening of the 19th.
Once abducted, he would be flown to Argentina. Simultaneously, Frei
would resign and leave the country. The cabinet would also resign, and

a junta led by an unnamed general would dissolve the congress. The
CIA learned that Valenzuela was at pains to state to his fellow plotters
that the dissolution of the congress would be their only
"unconstitutional act." [64] Gen. Viaux, although aware of the
Valenzuela plot, was not involved, it turned out. And Viaux, himself,
may even have been a target for arrest by the Carabinieros in the
aftermath of a Valenzuela coup, since they planned to use the
kidnapping to "justify a move against leftist and rightist extremists."
[65]
The first attempt by the Valenzuela group to kidnap Schneider failed
because his team "became nervous due to inexperience." [66] A second
attempt on the following night also failed, and the CIA assured
Valenzuela that "USG support for anti-Allende action continues." [67]
Valenzuela, for his part, assured the Americans that the Chilean
military was still set to move. While assurances were being traded, the
CIA concluded that "since Valenzuela's group is apparently having
considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the
prospect for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October
now appears remote." [68] There would be no kidnapping, no coup.
Unexpected Turn
But, suddenly, events deviated from the anticipated script: Only five
hours after the machine guns were delivered to the Valenzuela group on
22 October, armed men ambushed Gen. Schneider on his way to work.
Drawing his sidearm, Schneider was shot by the attackers, who were
part of Viaux's gang. He died on the operating table on 25 October. The
shooting occurred just 48 hours before Allende was to be confirmed in
a congressional vote.
After the shooting, there was confusion among the CIA officers in
Santiago, as well as a degree of hope. They were not entirely sure who
had launched the attack, and whether it was a kidnapping attempt or an
assassination attempt. They hoped that the action was the beginning of
a move against Allende, but there was no evidence that this was going
to occur. [69]

No coup immediately followed the shooting. On the morning of 24
October, an intelligence summary produced at Langley stated:
"Yesterday, Gen. Viaux informed some of his followers that a military
coup would be attempted during the early hours of 24 October . . . [but]
there has been thus far no indication that the conspirators intend to push
on with their plans to overthrow the government." [70] The cable
concluded: "It was agreed that given the short time span and the
circumstances prevailing in Chile, a maximum effort has been achieved,
and that now only Chileans themselves can manage a successful coup."
In Santiago, a state of emergency was imposed after the shooting.
Viaux and his gang surrendered, fled, or were arrested. The military
and the Carabineros were confined to barracks. Valenzuela was
appointed "Jefe del Plaza for Law and Order," and one Gen. Prats filled
the spot of the then still gravely injured Schneider. Allende's Unidad
Popular (the communist front party) reacted immediately with public
appeals to block any "counter-revolutionary" actions, and the resulting
tension seemed to favor a coup. But the CIA still reported "Santiago is
quiet." [71]
Whatever the intended outcome from the kidnapping/assassination, it
ultimately increased the desire of the politicians and most of the
military to ensure that the constitutional process was followed.
Although Valenzuela was in a powerful position and could have taken
over, the mood had changed so dramatically that he did not make a
move. On Saturday, 24 October, Allende's election as president was
duly confirmed by the Chilean congress--with 153 votes in favor and
only 42 votes either against or abstaining. [72] Attempts to prevent
Allende from taking power had failed.
Examining the American Role
Although a successful military move against Allende had been unlikely
from the start, the death of Gen. Schneider guaranteed the collapse of
American hopes. Clearly Schneider's murder was not in the interests of
the American government. Could they have