CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 | Page 6

Korry made it
clear that "Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps
less--to launch a successful coup." The point had been made, and the
Track II staff, Kissinger included, came to the conclusion that ". . . a
coup climate does not presently exist. [Karamessines] noted that the
highly unpredictable Gen. Viaux is the only individual seemingly ready
to attempt a coup and expressed the view that his chances of mounting
a successful one were slight. . . . [Kissinger] observed that there
presently appeared to be little the US can do to influence the Chilean
situation one way or another. Those present concurred." [52] This was
acted upon the same day, and a directive was issued to the CIA in
Santiago to cut off plotting with Viaux:
It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to
Viaux warning him against precipitate action. In essence our message
was to state: 'We have reviewed your plans, and based on your
information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a
coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your
capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets . . . the time will come
when you with all your other friends can do something. You will

continue to have our support.' [53]
Many commentators have pointed out that this message does not truly
"turn off" the Viaux plotting or, as Kissinger has stated, end Track II
plotting entirely. Subsequent messages, however, shed some light on
this controversial issue. One particular piece of evidence is a
memorandum Kissinger wrote to the President on 18 October 1970.
This lengthy memorandum starts by stating: "It now appears certain
that Allende will be elected president of Chile in the October 24
congressional run-off elections. He will be inaugurated November 3."
[54] It is clear that Kissinger accepted the reality--that no coup could
occur in time--briefed to him by Amb. Korry and many other
individuals involved in Chile. The next step, Kissinger stated, was "the
formulation of a specific strategy to deal with an Allende government."
Further statements in the same memo indicate that this step should be
taken because: "Our capacity to engineer Allende's overthrow quickly
has been demonstrated to be sharply limited." [55] Having ordered the
end to US involvement over the short term with the only individual
actively plotting a coup, the executive took the next logical step of
planning for a coherent policy toward an Allende government.
Best Laid Plans . . .
While the White House was developing a new strategy for Chile, Viaux
was continuing to solidify his plans. By 14 October, the CIA had
learned that the Viaux group had decided that the best way for them to
trigger a coup was to kidnap Gen. Schneider and remove him from
Chile. [56] This would convince the Chilean military that chaos was
just around the corner and, therefore, they should prevent Allende from
taking power. By assuming power themselves to quell the "chaos," they
could open the way--under Chilean constitutional law--for new
elections, which, it was assumed, Eduardo Frei would win. The
kidnapping, the CIA learned, was set for 17 October "between
0200--0700." [57]
Coincident with the White House's decision to put Viaux on hold, a
Chilean officer approached the United States requesting funds for a
similar "kidnap Schneider" plan. Although it initially seemed possible

that he was "fronting" for Viaux, the CIA concluded that he was not
and decided to provide the individual with some funds to purchase
weapons. [58] This was a last-ditch effort, and the Agency was told by
another contact on the same day that "[Name deleted] believes that
Viaux's attempt to kidnap Schneider will not be made and now sees no
possibility for anything to happen prior 24 October. . . .[CIA agent]
reminded [Chilean contact] that US stands ready to help with anything
plotting elements may need." The contact replied with an honesty that
may have been the best summary to date of the Chilean situation:
"What we need," he said, "is not money but a general with b***s." [59]
The appropriately equipped general was not far away, as it turned out.
A memorandum of 16 October noted that "coup rumblings within and
outside the military have increased in recent days." [60] Gen.
Valenzuela, still unsure of the necessity for a coup, arranged for a
meeting with Gen. Schneider on the evening of 16 October to attempt
to convince the commander-in-chief of the need for the military to
intervene in the political process. The "meeting . . . turned out [to be a]
complete fiasco." [61] The following night, Valenzuela, now finally
convinced of the necessity of direct action, sent a representative to meet
with the US defense attachŽ in a dark corner of