An Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, Humour, Railery, Satire, and Ridicule | Page 7

first Sight, and there is required no Labour of Thoughts to examine what Truth, or Reason, there is in it. The Mind, without looking any further, rests satisfied with the Agreeableness of the Picture, and the Gaiety of the Fancy. And it is a kind of an Affront to go about to examine it by the severe Rules of Truth, and good Reason, whereby it appears, that it conflicts in something that is not perfectly conformable to them.
It is to be observed that Mr. Locke has here only occasionally, and passantly, delivered his Sentiments upon this Subject; but yet he has very happily explained the chief Properties of WIT. It was his Remark First, that it lies for the most Part in assembling together with Quickness and Variety Objects, which possess an Affinity, or Congruity, with each other; which was the first just Information obtained by the literary World, upon this Subject.
As to what he adds, That the Intention, and Effects, of this Assemblage of similar Objects, is _to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy_, it is, as I humbly apprehend, not quite perfect: For the Business of this Assemblage is not merely to raise pleasant Pictures in the Fancy, but also to enlighten thereby the original Subject.--This is evident; because in such Assemblages, the only Foundation upon which the new Subject is suddenly introduced, is the Affinity, and consequently the Illustration, it bears to the first Subject.--The Introduction of pleasant Pictures and Visions, which present not a new Illustration, and Light, to the original Subjects, being rather wild Sallies of Vivacity, than well-aimed, apposite Strokes of WIT.
It is Mr. _Locke_'s Conclusion, at last, That WIT _consists in something that is not perfectly conformable to Truth, and good Reason_.--This is a Problem of some Curiosity; and I apprehend Mr. _Locke_'s Determination upon it to be right:--For the Direction of WIT is absolutely different from the Direction of TRUTH and GOOD REASON; It being the Aim of WIT to strike the _Imagination_; of TRUTH and GOOD REASON, to convince the _Judgment_: From thence they can never be perfectly coincident.
It is however true, that there may be Instances of WIT, wherein the Agreement between the two Objects shall be absolutely just, and perceived to be such at the first Glance. Such Instances of WIT, will be then also _Self-evident_ TRUTHS. They will both agree in their obvious, and quick _Perspicuity_; but will be still different in this, that the Effort of the One is to strike the Fancy, whereas the Other is wholly exerted in gratifying the Judgment.
The Sentiments of Mr. Addison upon WIT, are professedly delivered in the Spectator No. 62. annexed to the following Essay. He has there justly commended Mr. _Locke_'s Description of WIT; but what he adds, by Way of Explanation to it, that the Assemblage of Ideas must be such as shall give Delight, and Surprize, is not true, in regard to the Former, Delight being no essential Property of WIT; for if the original Subject be unpleasant, or deformed, the sudden unexpected Arrangement of a similar Object with it, may give us Surprize, and be indisputably WIT, and yet be far from creating any Delight.
This Gentleman has also given the following Example, in order to illustrate the Necessity there is, that Surprize should be always an Attendant upon WIT.
"When a Poet tells us, the Bosom of his Mistress is as white as Snow, there is no Wit in the Comparison; but when he adds, with a Sigh, that it as cold too, it then grows to Wit."
--To compare a Girl's Bosom to Snow for its Whiteness I apprehend to be WIT, notwithstanding the Authority of so great a Writer to the contrary. For there is a Lustre resulting from the natural and splendid Agreement between these Objects, which will always produce WIT; such, as cannot be destroyed, though it will quickly be rendered trite, by frequent Repetition.
This Problem, How far SURPRIZE _is, or is not, necessary to_ WIT, I humbly apprehend, may be thus solved.--In Subjects which have a natural and splendid Agreement, there will always be WIT upon their Arrangement together; though when it becomes trite, and not accompanied with Surprize, the Lustre will be much faded;--But where the Agreement is forced and strained, Novelty and Surprize are absolutely necessary to usher it in; An unexpected Assemblage of this Sort, striking our Fancy, and being gaily admitted at first to be WIT; which upon frequent Repetition, the Judgment will have examined, and rise up against it wherever it appears;--So that in short, in Instances where the Agreement is strained and defective, which indeed are abundantly the most general, Surprize is a necessary Passport to WIT; but Surprize is not necessary to WIT, where the Agreement between the two Subjects is natural