An Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, Humour, Railery, Satire, and Ridicule | Page 6

of entirely exhausting a Subject, for which Dr. Barrow was remarkable; and if the Point was, to exhibit all the various Forms and Appearances, not of WIT only, but of Raillery, Satire, Sarcasms, and of every Kind of Poignancy and Pleasantry of Sentiment, and Expression, he seems to have perfectly succeeded; there being perhaps no Variety, in all the Extent of these Subjects, which he has not presented to View in this Description.--But he does not pretend to give any Definition of WIT, intimating rather that it is quite impossible to be given: And indeed from his Description of it, as a Proteus, appearing in numberless various Colours, and Forms; and from his mistaking, and presenting for WIT, other different Mixtures and Substances, it is evident that his Idea of it was quite confused and uncertain: It is true, he has discovered a vast Scope of Fertility of Genius, and an uncommon Power of collecting together a Multitude of Objects upon any Occasion, but he has here absolutely mistaken his work; for instead of exhibiting the Properties of WIT in a clearer Light, and confuting the false Claims which are made to it, he has made it his whole Business to perplex it the more, by introducing, from all Corners, a monstrous Troop of new unexpected Pretenders.
Dryden, in the Preface to his Opera, entitled, The State of Innocence, or Fall of Man, gives the following Decree upon WIT. The Definition of WIT, (which has been so often attempted, and ever unsuccessfully by many Poets) is only this: That it is _a Propriety of Thoughts and Words; or in other Terms, Thoughts and Words elegantly adapted to the Subject_.
If Mr. Dryden imagined, that he had succeeded himself in this Definition, he was extremely mistaken; for nothing can be more distant from the Properties of WIT, than those he describes. He discovers no Idea of the Surprize, and Brilliancy of WIT, or of the sudden Light thrown upon a Subject. Instead of once pointing at these, he only describes the Properties of clear Reasoning, which are _a Propriety of Thoughts and Words_;--Whereas WIT, in its sudden Flashes, makes no Pretension to _Reasoning_; but is perceived in the pleasant Surprize which it starts, and in the Light darted upon a Subject, which instantly vanishes again, without abiding a strict Examination.
The other Definition he gives, which is, Thoughts and Words elegantly adapted to the Subject, is very different from the former, but equally unhappy.
For Propriety, in Thoughts and Words, consists in exhibiting _clear, pertinent Ideas_, in precise and perspicuous Words.
Whereas ELEGANCE consists in the compt, well pruned and succinct Turn of a Subject.
The Object of the First, is to be clear, and _perspicuous_; whence it often appears in pursuit of these, not compt or _succinct_: Whereas the Essence of ELEGANCE is to be compt and succinct, for the Sake of which Ornaments it often neglect Perspicuity, and Clearness.--In short, a Propriety of Thoughts and Words, may subsist without any _Elegance_; as an Elegance of Thoughts and Words may appear without a perfect Propriety.
The last Definition, as it is thus very different from the former is also equally unhappy: For ELEGANCE is no essential Property of WIT. Pure WIT resulting solely from the quick Elucidation of one Subject, by the sudden Arrangement, and Comparison of it, with another Subject.--If the two Objects arranged together are elegant, and polite, there will then be superadded to the WIT, an Elegance and Politeness of Sentiment, which will render the WIT more amiable. But if the Objects are vulgar, obscene, or deformed, provided the first be elucidated, in a lively Manner, by, the sudden Arrangement of it with the second, there will be equally WIT; though, the Indelicacy of Sentiment attending it, will render such WIT shocking and abominable.
It is with the highest Respect for the great Mr. Locke, that I deliver his Sentiments upon this Subject.
And hence, perhaps, may be given some Reason of that common Observation, that Men who have a great deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the clearest Judgment or deepest Reason: For Wit lying most in the Assemblage of Ideas, and putting those together with Quickness and Variety, wherein can be found any Assemblance or Congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy. Judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side; in separating carefully one from another, Ideas, wherein can be found the least Difference, thereby to avoid being missed by Similitude, and by Affinity to take one thing for another. This is a Way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion; wherein for the most Part lies that Entertainment and Pleasantry of Wit, which strikes so lively on the Fancy, and therefore is acceptable to all People, because its Beauty appears at