An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume II. | Page 5

connexion which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds
it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the application of names to
things, that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things, and retain
also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar
appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human
capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we
meet with: every bird and beast men saw; every tree and plant that
affected the senses, could not find a place in the most capacious
understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory,
that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army by
his proper name, we may easily find a reason why men have never
attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies
over their heads; much less to call every leaf of plants, or grain of sand
that came in their way, by a peculiar name.
3. And would be useless, if it were possible.
Secondly, If it were possible, it would yet be useless; because it would
not serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up
names of particular things, that would not serve them to communicate
their thoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only
that they may be understood: which is then only done when, by use or
consent, the sound I make by the organs of speech, excites in another
man's mind who hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it.
This cannot be done by names applied to particular things; whereof I
alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be
significant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all
those very particular things which had fallen under my notice.
4. A distinct name for every particular thing not fitted for enlargement
of knowledge.
Thirdly, But yet, granting this also feasible, (which I think is not,) yet a
distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use
for the improvement of knowledge: which, though founded in
particular things, enlarges itself by general views; to which things

reduced into sorts, under general names, are properly subservient.
These, with the names belonging to them, come within some compass,
and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can
contain, or use requires. And therefore, in these, men have for the most
part stopped: but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing
particular things by appropriated names, where convenience demands it.
And therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with,
and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons,
they make use of proper names; and there distinct individuals have
distinct denominations.
5. What things have proper Names, and why.
Besides persons, countries also, cities, rivers, mountains, and other the
like distinctions of lace have usually found peculiar names, and that for
the same reason; they being such as men have often as occasion to
mark particularly, and, as it were, set before others in their discourses
with them. And I doubt not but, if we had reason to mention particular
horses as often as as have reason to mention particular men, we should
have proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other, and
Bucephalus would be a word as much in use as Alexander. And
therefore we see that, amongst jockeys, horses have their proper names
to be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants:
because, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or that
particular horse when he is out of sight.
6. How general Words are made.
The next thing to be considered is,--How general words come to be
made. For, since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we
by general terms; or where find we those general natures they are
supposed to stand for? Words become general by being made the signs
of general ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them
the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may
determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of
abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than
one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as
we call it) of that sort.

7. Shown by the way we enlarge our complex ideas from infancy.
But, to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be amiss
to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and observe by
what degrees