An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume II. | Page 4

modes, we shall
speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large,
when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes and substances in
particular: though give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting the
use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their
signification, whenever we make them stand for anything but those
ideas we have in our own minds.
6. Words by Use readily excite Ideas of their objects.

Concerning words, also, it is further to be considered:
First, that they being immediately the signs of men's ideas, and by that
means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions,
and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have
within their own breasts; there comes, by constant use, to be such a
connexion between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for, that the
names heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects
themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the
senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities, and in
all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us.
7. Words are often used without Signification, and Why.
Secondly, That though the proper and immediate signification of words
are ideas in the mind of the speaker, yet, because by familiar use from
our cradles, we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly,
and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our
memories, but yet are not always careful to examine or settle their
significations perfectly; it often happens that men, even when they
would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set their
thoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of
them learned before the ideas are known for which they stand: therefore
some, not only children but men, speak several words no otherwise
than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been
accustomed to those sounds. But so far as words are of use and
signification, so far is there a constant connexion between the sound
and the idea, and a designation that the one stands for the other; without
which application of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant
noise.
8. Their Signification perfectly arbitrary, not the consequence of a
natural connexion.
Words, by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in
men certain ideas so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose
a natural connexion between them. But that they signify only men's
peculiar ideas, and that BY A PERFECT ARBITRARY IMPOSITION,

is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the
same language) the same ideas we take them to be signs of: and every
man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he
pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas
in their minds that he has, when they use the same words that he does.
And therefore the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that
power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new
Latin word: which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily
appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and
common language of his subjects. It is true, common use, by a tacit
consent, appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages,
which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a man
applies it to the same idea, he does not speak properly: and let me add,
that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he
makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But
whatever be the consequence of any man's using of words differently,
either from their general meaning, or the particular sense of the person
to whom he addresses them; this is certain, their signification, in his use
of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else.
CHAPTER III.
OF GENERAL TERMS.

1. The greatest Part of Words are general terms.
All things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thought
reasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, should
be so too,--I mean in their signification: but yet we find quite the
contrary. The far greatest part of words that make all languages are
general terms: which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but
of reason and necessity.
2. That every particular Thing should have a Name for itself is
impossible.

First, It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct
peculiar name. For, the signification and use of words depending on
that