An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findin | Page 4

earthquake response exercises, and the problem is
raised by almost every emergency preparedness official at every level

of government. Consequently, a major problem for resolution is the
operational integration of communications systems and networks
among the relevant Federal, State, and local agencies.
Because of their network-like character, most systems for
transportation and water and power generation and distribution, as a
whole, are resistant to failure, despite potentially severe local damage.
These systems would suffer serious local outages, particularly in the
first several days after the event, but would resume service over a few
weeks to months. The principal difficulty would be the greatly
increased need for these systems in the first few days after the event,
when lifesaving activities would be paramount.
Portions of the San Francisco Bay Area and of the Los Angeles Area
contain substantial concentrations of manufacturing capacity for guided
missiles and space vehicles, semiconductors, aircraft parts, electronic
computing equipment, and airframes. Their specific vulnerability to the
postulated earthquakes was not analyzed. In the event of major damage,
however, the long-term impacts may be mitigated somewhat by such
measures as the use of underutilized capacity located elsewhere,
substitution of capacity from other industries, imports, use of other
products, and drawing-down of inventories.
Since we have not recently experienced a catastrophic earthquake in the
United States, there are many unknowns which must be estimated with
best judgment. This is true particularly for the response of individuals
as well as governmental and other institutions. Popular assumptions of
post-disaster behavior include antisocial behavior and the need for
martial law, the breakdown of government institutions, and the
requirement for the quick assertion of outside leadership and control.
Practical experience and field studies of disasters, however, indicate
that these assumptions are not necessarily correct. On the contrary, the
impacts of the disaster commonly produce a sense of solidarity and
cooperativeness among the survivors. Nonetheless, the perception
remains among emergency response officials that there will be an
increased need for law enforcement following the event.
Another major unknown involves whether a medium or short-term

warning of the event would be possible and how such a warning could
be utilized most effectively. The technology for earthquake prediction
is in an early stage of development and, therefore it is problematical
that researchers will succeed in issuing a short-term warning before a
catastrophic earthquake, should the event occur in the next few years.
Yet as research progresses, scientifically-based, intermediate-term
warnings are possible, but subject to a high degree of uncertainty.
Consequently, response preparations must be made for both an
earthquake without warning, and one with a short-or intermediate-term
warning, possibly with a significant level of uncertainty.
E. CAPABILITY FOR RESPONSE
Planning for response to a large-scale disaster is a complicated process
encompassing many variables such as population densities and
distribution characteristics; land-use patterns and construction
techniques; geographical configurations; vulnerability of transportation;
communications and other lifeline systems; complex response
operations; long-term physical, social, and economic recovery policies.
These factors, together with the realization that an earthquake has the
potential for being the greatest single-event catastrophe in California,
make it incumbent upon the State to maintain as high a level of
emergency readiness as is practicable, and to provide guidance and
assistance to local jurisdictions desiring to plan and prepare for such
events. Annex 2 reviews the general nature of preparedness planning
and the basic characteristics of California and Federal Government
plans.
Federal, State, and local emergency response capabilities are judged to
be adequate for moderate earthquakes--those that are most likely to
occur frequently in California and cause property damage in the range
of $1 billion. Such an event, however, would severely tax existing
resources and provide a major test of management relationships among
different governmental levels. Federal, State, and local officials,
however, are quick to point out serious shortcomings in their ability to
respond to a catastrophic earthquake. An analysis of the preparedness
posture of 60 local governments, 34 California State organizations, and

17 Federal agencies, carried out by the California Office of Emergency
Services (OES) and FEMA, indicates that response to such an
earthquake would become disorganized and largely ineffective. Many
governmental units have generalized earthquake response plans, some
have tailored earthquake plans, and several plans are regularly
exercised. The coordination of these plans among jurisdictions,
agencies, and levels of government, however, is inadequate. In addition,
the potential for prediction is not incorporated; long-term recovery
issues are not considered; and communications problems are significant,
as discussed above. Overall, Federal preparedness is deficient at this
time. Early reaction to a catastrophic event would likely be
characterized by delays, ineffective response, and ineffectively
coordinated delivery of support.
FEMA Region IX (San Francisco) has drafted an Earthquake Response
Plan for the San Francisco Bay area. Annex 2 gives an overview of this
draft plan. This is a site-specific plan for response to