A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge | Page 9

has only one
signification. (2.) That the only end of language is the communication
of our ideas--Ed.]
20. SOME OF THE ENDS OF LANGUAGE.--Besides, the
communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end
of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the
raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the
putting the mind in some particular disposition--to which the former is
in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted,
when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently
happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect
with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in hearing or
reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration,
disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the perception
of certain words, without any ideas coming between. At first, indeed,
the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to produce
those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when
language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of
the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at

first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now
quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise
of a GOOD THING, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not
the being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we
think not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to
ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so
little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will
evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the
propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks
of ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the
hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with
a design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are
supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells
me "Aristotle has said it," all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me
to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which
custom has annexed to that name. And this effect is often so instantly
produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their
judgment to authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea
either of his person, writings, or reputation should go before [Note.].
Innumerable examples of this kind may be given, but why should I
insist on those things which every one's experience will, I doubt not,
plentifully suggest unto him?
[Note: "So close and immediate a connection may custom establish
betwixt the very word ARISTOTLE, and the motions of assent and
reverence in the minds of some men."--Edit 1710.]
21. CAUTION IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE NECESSARY.--We
have, I think, shown the impossibility of ABSTRACT IDEAS. We
have considered what has been said for them by their ablest patrons;
and endeavored to show they are of no use for those ends to which they
are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source
from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.--It
cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means
all that stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint
labours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into
the view and made the possession of one single person. But at the same

time it must be owned that most parts of knowledge have been
strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general
ways of speech wherein they are delivered.[Note 1.] Since therefore
words are so apt to impose on the understanding[Note 2.], whatever
ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my
view, keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names
which long and constant use has so strictly united with them; from
which I may expect to derive the following advantages:
[Note 1: "That it may almost be made a question, whether language has
contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the
sciences."--Edit 1710.] [Note 2: "I am resolved in my inquiries to make
as little use of them as possibly I can."--Edit 1710.]
22. FIRST, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies PURELY
VERBAL--the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences
has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound