A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge | Page 8

George Berkeley
consider the great pains,
industry, and parts that have for so many ages been laid out on the
cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding
all this the far greater part of them remains full of darkness and
uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have an end, and even
those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent
demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly
irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, taking all
together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to
mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and
amusement--I say the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into
a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps
cease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the
world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, has a more wide and
extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than [Note.] this of
abstract general ideas.
[Note: "That we have been endeavouring to overthrow."--Edit 1710.]
18. I come now to consider the SOURCE OF THIS PREVAILING

NOTION, and that seems to me to be LANGUAGE. And surely
nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of
an opinion so universally received. The truth of this appears as from
other reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of
abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming;
from which it is a clear consequence that if there had been no such
things as speech or universal signs there never had been any thought of
abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere of the Essay on Human
Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein words have
contributed to the origin of that mistake.--First [Vide sect. xix.] then, it
is thought that every name has, or ought to have, ONE ONLY precise
and settled signification, which inclines men to think there are certain
ABSTRACT, DETERMINATE IDEAS that constitute the true and
only immediate signification of each general name; and that it is by the
mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify
any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one
precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they all
signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which
doth evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly
appear to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be OBJECTED
that every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain
signification. For example, a TRIANGLE is defined to be A PLAIN
SURFACE COMPREHENDED BY THREE RIGHT LINES, by which
that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other. To which I
answer, that in the definition it is not said whether the surface be great
or small, black or white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal
or unequal, nor with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all
which there may be great variety, and consequently there is NO ONE
SETTLED IDEA which limits the signification of the word
TRIANGLE. It is one thing for to keep a name constantly to the same
definition, and another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea;
the one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable.
19. SECONDLY, But, to give a farther account how WORDS came to
PRODUCE THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS, it must be
observed that it is a received opinion that language has NO OTHER
END but the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name

stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal certain that names
which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always mark
out PARTICULAR conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that
THEY STAND FOR ABSTRACT NOTIONS. That there are many
names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to
others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what
nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not
necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which
stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the
understanding the ideas they are made to stand for--in reading and
discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in
ALGEBRA, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each
letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each
letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed
to stand for.[Note.]
[Note: Language has become the source or origin of abstract general
ideas on account of a twofold error.--(1.) That every word
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