A Theologico-Political Treatise part 4 | Page 6

to break my compact, and act
as if my promise had never been uttered. (36) I say that I should have
perfect natural right to do so, whether I was actuated by true and
evident reason, or whether I was actuated by mere opinion in thinking I
had promised rashly; whether my reasons were true or false, I should be
in fear of a greater evil, which, by the ordinance of nature, I should
strive to avoid by every means in my power.

(16:37) We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid
by its utility, without which it becomes null and void. (38) It is,
therefore, foolish to ask a man to keep his faith with us for ever, unless
we also endeavour that the violation of the compact we enter into shall
involve for the violator more harm than good. (39) This consideration
should have very great weight in forming a state. (40) However, if all
men could be easily led by reason alone, and could recognize what is
best and most useful for a state, there would be no one who would not
forswear deceit, for everyone would keep most religiously to their
compact in their desire for the chief good, namely, the shield and
buckler of the commonwealth. (41) However, it is far from being the
case that all men can always be easily led by reason alone; everyone is
drawn away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and
the like so engross the mind that, reason has no place therein. (42)
Hence, though men make - promises with all the appearances of good
faith, and agree that they will keep to their engagement, no one can
absolutely rely on another man's promise unless there is something
behind it. (43) Everyone has by nature a right to act deceitfully. and to
break his compacts, unless he be restrained by the hope of some greater
good, or the fear of some greater evil.
(16:44) However, as we have shown that the natural right of the
individual is only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring,
either willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of
another, he in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and
further, that the Sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has
sovereign power, wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain
them by threats of the universally feared punishment of death; such
sovereign right he will retain only so long as he can maintain his power
of enforcing his will; otherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one
who is stronger than he will be bound unwillingly to obey him.
(16:45) In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of
natural right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept - that is, if
each individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic,
the latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is,
it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone will be
bound to obey, under pain of the severest punishment. (46) A body
politic of this kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a

society which wields all its power as a whole. (47) The sovereign
power is not restrained by any laws, but everyone is bound to obey it in
all things; such is the state of things implied when men either tacitly or
expressly handed over to it all their power of self-defence, or in other
words, all their right. (48) For if they had wished to retain any right for
themselves, they ought to have taken precautions for its defence and
preservation; as they have not done so, and indeed could not have done
so without dividing and consequently ruining the state, they placed
themselves absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power; and,
therefore, having acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity
demanded, they are obliged to fulfil the commands of the sovereign
power, however absurd these may be, else they will be public enemies,
and will act against reason, which urges the preservation of the state as
a primary duty. (49) For reason bids us choose the least of two evils.
(16:50) Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the
dominion and will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light
heart: for we have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of
imposing their will, so long as they have the full power to enforce it: if
such power be lost their right to command is lost also, or lapses to
those who have assumed it and can keep it. (51) Thus it is very rare for
sovereigns to impose