A Theologico-Political Treatise part 4 | Page 5

Benedict de Spinoza
deceit, nor, indeed,
any of the means suggested by desire.
(16:20) This we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the
laws of human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and
preservation; her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the
eternal order of nature, wherein man is but a speck; it is by the
necessity of this alone that all individuals are conditioned for living and
acting in a particular way. (21) If anything, therefore, in nature seems
to us ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we only know in part, and
are almost entirely ignorant of the order and interdependence of nature
as a whole, and also because we want everything to be arranged
according to the dictates of our human reason; in reality that which
reason considers evil, is not evil in respect to the order and laws of
nature as a whole, but only in respect to the laws of our reason.
(16:22) Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to
live according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said,
they have men's true good for their object. (23) Moreover, everyone
wishes to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and
this would be quite impossible so long as everyone did everything he
liked, and reason's claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and
anger; there is no one who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity,
hatred, anger, and deceit, and who does not seek to avoid them as much
as he can. [16:3] (24) When we reflect that men without mutual help, or
the aid of reason, must needs live most miserably, as we clearly proved
in Chap. V., we shall plainly see that men must necessarily come to an
agreement to live together as securely and well as possible if they are to
enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally belong to them as
individuals, and their life should be no more conditioned by the force
and desire of individuals, but by the power and will of the whole body.
(25) This end they will be unable to attain if desire be their only guide
(for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a different direction);
they must, therefore, most firmly decree and establish that they will be
guided in everything by reason (which nobody will dare openly to

repudiate lest he should be taken for a madman), and will restrain any
desire which is injurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to all as
they would be done by, and that they will defend their neighbour's
rights as their own.
(16:26) How such a compact as this should be entered into, how
ratified and established, we will now inquire.
(27) Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever
neglects anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of
gaining a greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does
anyone endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or
gaining a greater good. (28) That is, everyone will, of two goods,
choose that which he thinks the greatest; and, of two evils, that which
he thinks the least. (29) I say advisedly that which he thinks the greatest
or the least, for it does not necessarily follow that he judges right. (30)
This law is so deeply implanted in the human mind that it ought to be
counted among eternal truths and axioms.
(16:31) As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated, no
one can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all
things [Endnote 26], and in general no one will abide by his promises,
unless under the fear of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. (32)
An example will make the matter clearer. (33) Suppose that a robber
forces me to promise that I will give him my goods at his will and
pleasure. (34) It is plain (inasmuch as my natural right is, as I have
shown, co-extensive with my power) that if I can free myself from this
robber by stratagem, by assenting to his demands, I have the natural
right to do so, and to pretend to accept his conditions. (35) Or again,
suppose I have genuinely promised someone that for the space of
twenty days I will not taste food or any nourishment; and suppose I
afterwards find that was foolish, and cannot be kept without very great
injury to myself; as I am bound by natural law and right to choose the
least of two evils, I have complete right
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