A Candid Examination of Theism | Page 3

here defined must remain
without material modification as long as our intelligence remains
human.
LONDON, 1878.

* * * * *
ANALYSIS.
CHAPTER I.
EXAMINATION OF ILLOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF
THEISM.
SECT.
1. Introductory.
2. Object of the chapter.
3. The Argument from the Inconceivability of Self-existence.
4. The Argument from the Desirability of there being a God.
5. The Argument from the Presence of Human Aspirations.
6. The Argument from Consciousness.
7. The Argument for a First Cause.
CHAPTER II.
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN
MIND.
8. Introductory.
9. Examination of the Argument, and the independent coincidence of
my views regarding it with those of Mr. Mill.
10. Locke's exposition of the Argument, and a re-enunciation of it in
the form of a Syllogism.
11. The Syllogism defective in that it cannot explain Mind in the

abstract. Mill quoted and answered. This defect in the Syllogism clearly
defined.
12. The Syllogism further defective, in that it assumes Intelligence to
be the only possible cause of Intelligence. This assumption amounts to
begging the whole question as to the being of a God. Inconceivability
of Matter thinking no proof that it may not think. Locke himself
strangely concedes this. His fallacies and self-contradictions pointed
out in an Appendix.
13. Objector to the Syllogism need not be a Materialist, but assuming
that he is one, he is as much entitled to the hypothesis that Matter
thinks as a Theist is to his hypothesis that it does not.
14. The two hypotheses are thus of exactly equivalent value, save that
while Theism is arbitrary, Materialism has a certain basis of fact to rest
upon. This basis defined in a footnote, where also Professor Clifford's
essay on "Body and Mind" is briefly examined. Difficulty of estimating
the worth of the Argument as to the most conceivable being most likely
true.
15. Locke's comparison between certainty of the Inconceivability
Argument as applied to Theism and to mathematics shown to contain a
virtual though not a formal fallacy.
16. Summary of considerations as to the value of this Argument from
Inconceivability.
17. Introductory to the other Arguments in favour of the conclusion that
only Intelligence can have caused Intelligence.
18. Locke's presentation of the view that the cause must contain all that
is contained in the effects. His statements contradicted. Mill quoted to
show that the analogy of Nature is against the doctrine of higher
perfections never growing out of lower ones.
19. Enunciation of the last of the Arguments in favour of the
proposition that only Intelligence can cause Intelligence. Hamilton

quoted to show that in his philosophy the entire question as to the being
of a God hinges upon that as to whether or not human volitions are
caused.
20. Absurdity of the old theory of Free-will. Hamilton erroneously
identified this theory with the fact that we possess a moral sense. His
resulting dilemma.
21. Although Hamilton was wrong in thus identifying genuine fact with
spurious theory, yet his Argument from the fact of our having a moral
sense remains to be considered.
22. The question here is merely as to whether or not the presence of the
moral sense can be explained by natural causes. A priori probability of
the moral sense having been evolved. A posteriori confirmation
supplied by Utilitarianism, &c.
23. Mill's presentation of the Argument a resuscitation of Paley's. His
criticism on Paley shown to be unfair.
24. The real fallacy of Paley's presentation pointed out.
25. The same fallacy pointed out in another way.
26. Paley's typical case quoted and examined, in order to illustrate the
root fallacy of his Argument from Design. Mill's observations upon this
Argument criticised.
27. Result yielded by the present analysis of the Argument from Design.
The Argument shown to be a petitio principii.
CHAPTER IV.
THE ARGUMENT FROM GENERAL LAWS.
28. My belief that no competent writer in favour of the Argument from
Design could have written upon it at all, had it not been for his
instinctive appreciation of the much more important Argument from

General Laws. The nature of this Argument stated, and its cogency
insisted upon.
29. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws prior to
the enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The Rev.
Baden Powell quoted.
30. The nature of General Laws when these are interpreted in terms of
the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. The word "Law" defined in
terms of this doctrine.
31. The rational standing of the Argument from General Laws
subsequent to the enunciation of the doctrine of the Conservation of
Energy.
32. The self-evolution of General Laws, or the objective aspect of the
question as to whether we may infer the presence of Mind in Nature
because Nature admits of being intelligently interrogated.
33. The subjective aspect