A Candid Examination of Theism | Page 2

reason is the faculty by
which he has enabled man to discover truth, and it is no less certain that

the scientific methods have proved themselves by far the most
trustworthy for reason to adopt. To my mind, therefore, it is impossible
to resist the conclusion that, looking to this undoubted pre-eminence of
the scientific methods as ways to truth, whether or not there is a God,
the question as to his existence is both more morally and more
reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a problem for
methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other light. Or,
stating the case in other words, I believe that in whatever degree we
intentionally abstain from using in this case what we know to be the
most trustworthy methods of inquiry in other cases, in that degree are
we either unworthily closing our eyes to a dreaded truth, or we are
guilty of the worst among human sins--"Depart from us, for we desire
not the knowledge of thy ways." If it is said that, supposing man to be
in a state of probation, faith, and not reason, must be the instrument of
his trial, I am ready to admit the validity of the remark; but I must also
ask it to be remembered, that unless faith has some basis of reason
whereon to rest, it differs in nothing from superstition; and hence that it
is still our duty to investigate the rational standing of the question
before us by the scientific methods alone. And I may here observe
parenthetically, that the same reasoning applies to all investigations
concerning the reality of a supposed revelation. With such
investigations, however, the present essay has nothing to do, although, I
may remark that if there is any evidence of a Divine Mind discernible
in the structure of a professing revelation, such evidence, in whatever
degree present, would be of the best possible kind for substantiating the
hypothesis of Theism.
Such being, then, what I conceive the only reasonable, as well as the
most truly moral, way of regarding the question to be discussed in the
following pages, even if the conclusions yielded by this discussion
were more negative than they are, I should deem it culpable cowardice
in me for this reason to publish anonymously. For even if an inquiry of
the present kind could ever result in a final demonstration of Atheism,
there might be much for its author to regret, but nothing for him to be
ashamed of; and, by parity of reasoning, in whatever degree the result
of such an inquiry is seen to have a tendency to negative the theistic
theory, the author should not be ashamed candidly to acknowledge his

conviction as to the degree of such tendency, provided only that his
conviction is an honest one, and that he is conscious of its having been
reached by using his faculties with the utmost care of which he is
capable.
If it is retorted that the question to be dealt with is of so ultimate a
character that even the scientific methods are here untrustworthy, I
reply that they are nevertheless the best methods available, and hence
that the retort is without pertinence: the question is still to be regarded
as a scientific one, although we may perceive that neither an
affirmative nor a negative answer can be given to it with any approach
to a full demonstration. But if the question is thus conceded to be one
falling within the legitimate scope of rational inquiry, it follows that the
mere fact of demonstrative certainty being here antecedently
impossible should not deter us from instituting the inquiry. It is a
well-recognised principle of scientific research, that however difficult
or impossible it may be to prove a given theory true or false, the theory
should nevertheless be tested, so far as it admits of being tested, by the
full rigour of the scientific methods. Where demonstration cannot be
hoped for, it still remains desirable to reduce the question at issue to the
last analysis of which it is capable.
Adopting these principles, therefore, I have endeavoured in the
following analysis to fix the precise standing of the evidence in favour
of the theory of Theism, when the latter is viewed in all the flood of
light which the progress of modern science--physical and
speculative--has shed upon it. And forasmuch as it is impossible that
demonstrated truth can ever be shown untrue, and forasmuch as the
demonstrated truths on which the present examination rests are the
most fundamental which it is possible for the human mind to reach, I
do not think it presumptuous to assert what appears to me a necessary
deduction from these facts--namely, that, possible errors in reasoning
apart, the rational position of Theism as