of Prussia, sensible 
and prudent, had refused to transform his neutrality into alliance; but he 
had used his influence over the smaller states of the empire, to induce 
them to maintain the same attitude. The Emperor Paul I., tossed to and 
fro by the impetuous movements of his ardent and unhealthy spirit, was 
piqued by the defeats of Suwarrow, and offended by the insufficiency 
of the help of Austria; he was discontented with the English 
government, and ill-humoredly kept himself apart from the coalition. 
The resumption of hostilities was imminent, and the grand projects of 
the First Consul began to unroll themselves. Active preparations had 
been till then confined to the army of the Rhine under Moreau. The 
army of Liguria, placed under the command of Masséna, with Genoa as 
a centre of operations, had received neither reinforcements nor 
munitions; its duty was to protect the passage of the Appenines against 
Mélas, whilst Moreau attacked upon the Rhine the army of Suabia, 
commanded by Marshal Kray. The occupation of Switzerland by the 
French army impeded the movements of the allies, by compelling them 
to withdraw their two armies from each other; the First Consul 
meditated a movement which should give him all the advantages of this
separation. Moreau in Germany, Masséna in Italy, were ordered at any 
cost to keep the enemy in check. Bonaparte silently formed a third 
army, the corps of which he cleverly dispersed, distracting the attention 
of Europe by the camp of the army of reserve at Dijon. Already he was 
preparing the grand campaign which should raise his glory to its 
pinnacle, and establish his power upon victory. In his idea everything 
was to be sacrificed to the personal glory of his successes. He 
conceived a project of attack by crossing the Rhine. Moreau, modest 
and disinterested, accepted the general plan of the war, and 
subordinated his operations to those of the First Consul; in his military 
capacity independent and resolute, he persisted in passing the Rhine at 
his pleasure. Bonaparte was enraged. "Moreau would not seek to 
understand me," cried he. He yielded, however, to the observations of 
General Dessoles, and always clever in subjugating those of whom he 
had need, he wrote to Moreau to restore him liberty of action. 
"Dessoles will tell you that no one is more interested than myself in 
your personal glory and your good fortune. The English embark in 
force; what do they want? I am to-day a sort of manikin, who has lost 
his liberty and his good fortune. Greatness is fine but in prospective 
and in imagination. I envy you your luck; you go with the heroes to do 
fine deeds. I would willingly barter my consular purple against one of 
your brigadier's epaulettes" (16th March, 1800). 
The army of Italy had been suffering for a long time with heroic 
courage; the well-known chief who took the command was more than 
any other suited to obtain from it the last efforts of devotion; it was the 
first to undergo the attack of the allied forces. The troops of Masséna 
were still scattered when he was assailed by Mélas. The fear of 
prematurely exhausting the insufficient resources of Genoa had 
prevented him from following the wise councils of Bonaparte, by 
massing his troops round that town. After a series of furious combats 
upon the upper Bormida, the French line found itself cut in two by the 
Austrians; General Suchet was obliged to fall back upon Nice, Masséna 
re-entered Genoa. A new effort forced back General Mélas beyond the 
Appenines. The attempt to rejoin the corps of General Suchet having 
failed, Masséna saw himself constrained to shut himself up in Genoa, 
in the midst of a population divided in opinion, but whose confidence
he had already known how to win. Resolved to occupy by resistance 
and by sorties all the forces of the allies, the general made preparations 
for sustaining the siege to the last extremity. All the provisions of the 
place were brought into the military magazines; the most severe order 
reigned in the distribution, but already scarcity was felt. The forces of 
Masséna, exhausted by frequent fights, diminished every day; bread 
failed; and the heroic obstinacy of the general alone compelled the 
Austrians to keep a considerable corps d'armée before a famished town 
(5th May, 1800). Mélas had in vain attempted to force the lines of Var, 
behind which General Suchet, too feeble to defend Nice, had cleverly 
entrenched himself. 
Moreau delayed to commence the campaign; his material was 
insufficient; Alsace and Switzerland, exhausted of resources, could not 
furnish the means of transport required by his movement. The First 
Consul urged him. "Obtain a success as soon as possible, that you may 
be able by a diversion in some degree to expedite the operations in 
Italy," he wrote    
    
		
	
	
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