thus precipitated the great
revolution which has touched every aspect of Far Eastern questions.
American traders watched carefully the commercial development of
Oriental ports, in which Americans have played an active rôle. In China
and in the maintenance of the open door especially, has America taken
the keenest interest. It is a matter of pride that American policy, always
of a purely commercial and peaceful nature, showed itself less
aggressive than that of some European states. But the Government
insisted upon the recognition of American interest in every Far Eastern
issue that might be raised, and was ready to intervene with those of
Europe in moments of crisis or danger.
A fairly clear-cut distinction might thus be made between American
pretensions in the different parts of the world. In the Americas the
nation claimed that sort of preëminence which was implied by the
Monroe Doctrine, a preëminence which as regards the Latin-American
states north of the Orinoco many felt must be actively enforced, in view
of special interests in the Caribbean. In the Far East the United States
claimed an equality of status with the European powers. In the rest of
the world, Europe, Africa, the Levant, the traditional American policy
of abstention held good absolutely, at least until the close of the
century.
The war with Spain affected American foreign policy vitally. The
holding of the Philippines, even if it were to prove merely temporary,
created new relations with all the great powers, of Europe as of Asia;
American Caribbean interests were strengthened; and the victory over a
European power, even one of a second class in material strength,
necessarily altered the traditional attitude of the nation towards the
other states of Europe and theirs towards it. This change was stimulated
by the close attention which American merchants and bankers began to
give to European combinations and policies, particularly to the
exploitation of thinly populated districts by European states. Even
before the Spanish War a keen-sighted student of foreign affairs,
Richard Olney, had declared that the American people could not
assume an attitude of indifference towards European politics and that
the hegemony of a single continental state would be disastrous to their
prosperity if not to their safety. Conversely Europeans began to watch
America with greater care. The victory over Spain was resented and the
fear of American commercial development began to spread. The Kaiser
had even talked of a continental customs union to meet American
competition. On the other hand, Great Britain, which had displayed a
benevolent attitude during the Spanish War and whose admiral at
Manila had perhaps blocked German interference, showed an
increasing desire for a close understanding. The friendship of the
United States, itself once a British dependency, for the British colonies
was natural and American interests in the Far East had much in
common with those of Great Britain.
External evidence of the new place of the United States in the world
might be found in the position taken by Roosevelt as peacemaker
between Russia and Japan, and, more significantly, in the rôle played
by the American representative, Henry White, at the Conference of
Algeciras in 1906. Not merely did the American Government consent
to discuss matters essentially European in character, but its attitude
proved almost decisive in the settlement then drafted. It is true that the
Senate, in approving that settlement, refused to assume responsibility
for its maintenance and reiterated its adherence to traditional policy.
But those who watched developments with intelligent eyes must have
agreed with Roosevelt when he said: "We have no choice, we people of
the United States, as to whether we shall play a great part in the affairs
of the world. That has been decided for us by fate, by the march of
events." Yet it may be questioned whether the average American,
during the first decade of the twentieth century, realized the change that
had come over relations with Europe. The majority of citizens certainly
felt that anything happening east of the Atlantic was none of their
business, just as everything that occurred in the Americas was entirely
outside the scope of European interference.
There is little to show that Woodrow Wilson, at the time when he
entered upon his duties as President, was one of the few Americans
who fully appreciated the new international position of the United
States and its consequences, even had there been no war. The
Democratic platform of 1912 hardly mentioned foreign policy, and
Wilson's Inaugural contained no reference to anything except domestic
matters. Certain problems inherited from the previous Administration
forced upon the President, however, the formulation, if not of a policy,
at least of an attitude. The questions of the Panama Canal tolls and
Japanese immigration, the Mexican situation, the Philippines, general
relations with Latin-America, all demanded attention. In each case
Wilson
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