Woodrow Wilson and the World War | Page 5

and not because of previous success along
special lines which would entitle them to public confidence.
The obstinacy of the President has become proverbial. The square chin,
unconsciously protruded in argument, indicates definitely his capacity,
as a British critic has put it, "to dig his toes in and hold on." On matters
of method, however, where a basic principle is not involved, he is
flexible. According as you approve or disapprove of him, he is "capable
of development" or "inconsistent." Thus he completely changed front
on the question of preparedness from 1914 to 1916. When the question
of the initiative and referendum arose in Oregon, his attitude was the
reverse of what it had been as professor of politics. When matters of
detail are under discussion, he has displayed much willingness for and
some skill in compromise, as was abundantly illustrated at Paris. But
when he thinks that a principle is at stake, he prefers to accept any
consequences, no matter how disastrous to his policy; witness his
refusal to accept the Lodge reservation on Article X of the League
Covenant.
All those included within the small circle of Wilson's intimates attest
the charm and magnetism of his personality. The breadth of his reading
is reflected in his conversation, which is enlivened by anecdotes that
illustrate his points effectively and illumined by a sense of humor
which some of his friends regard as his most salient trait. His manner is
marked by extreme courtesy and, in view of the fixity of his opinions, a
surprising lack of abruptness or dogmatism. But he has never been able
to capitalize such personal advantages in his political relations. Apart
from his intimates he is shy and reserved. The antithesis of Roosevelt,
who loved to meet new individualities, Wilson has the college
professor's shrinking from social contacts, and is not at ease in the
presence of those with whom he is not familiar. Naturally, therefore, he
lacks completely Roosevelt's capacity to make friends, and there is in
him no trace of his predecessor's power to find exactly the right
compliment for the right person. Under Roosevelt the White House

opened its doors to every one who could bring the President anything
of interest, whether in the field of science, literature, politics, or sport;
and the Chief Magistrate, no matter who his guest, instantly found a
common ground for discussion. That capacity Wilson did not possess.
Furthermore his health was precarious and he was physically incapable
of carrying the burden of the constant interviews that characterized the
life of his immediate predecessors in the presidential office. He lived
the life of a recluse and rarely received any one but friends of the
family at the White House dinner table.
While he thus saved himself from the social intercourse which for
Roosevelt was a relaxation but which for him would have proved a
nervous and physical drain, Wilson deprived himself of the political
advantages that might have been derived from more extensive
hospitality. He was unable to influence Congressmen except by reason
of his authority as head of the party or nation. He lost many a chance of
removing political opposition through the personal appeal which is so
flattering and effective. He seems to have thought that if his policy was
right in itself, Congressmen ought to vote for it, without the satisfaction
of personal arguments, a singular misappreciation of human nature. The
same was true of his relations with the Washington correspondents; he
was never able to establish a man to man basis of intercourse. This
incapacity in the vital matter of human contacts was, perhaps, his
greatest political weakness. If he had been able to arouse warm
personal devotion in his followers, if he could have inflamed them with
enthusiasm such as that inspired by Roosevelt, rather than mere
admiration, Wilson would have found his political task immeasurably
lightened. It is not surprising that his mistakes in tactics should have
been so numerous. His isolation and dependence upon tactical advisers,
such as Tumulty and Burleson, lacking broad vision, led him into
serious errors, most of which--such as his appeal for a Democratic
Congress in 1918, his selection of the personnel of the Peace
Commission, his refusal to compromise with the "mild reservationist
Senators" in the summer of 1919--were committed, significantly, when
he was not in immediate contact with Colonel House.
The political strength of Wilson did not result primarily from

intellectual power. His mind is neither profound nor subtle. His serious
writings are sound but not characterized by originality, nor in his
policies is there anything to indicate creative genius. He thinks straight
and possesses the ability to concentrate on a single line of effort. He is
skillful in catching an idea and adapting it to his purposes. Combined
with his power of expression and his