Types of Naval Officers | Page 6

fixed order upon
an assigned plan. The galley admiral therefore wielded a weapon far
more flexible and reliable, within the much narrower range of its
activities, than his successor in the days of sail; and engagements
between fleets of galleys accordingly reflected this condition, being
marked not only by greater carnage, but by tactical combinations and
audacity of execution, to which the sailing ship did not so readily lend
itself.
When the field of naval warfare became extended beyond the
Mediterranean,--for long centuries its principal scene,--the galley no
longer met the more exacting nautical conditions; and the introduction
of cannon, involving new problems of tactics and ship-building,
accelerated its disappearance. The traditions of galley-fighting,
however, remained, and were reinforced by the habits of land
fighting,--the same men in fact commanding armies on shore and fleets
at sea. In short, a period of transition ensued, marked, as such in their
beginnings are apt to be, by an evident lack of clearness in men's
appreciation of conditions, and of the path of development, with a
consequent confusion of outline in their practice. It is not always easy
to understand either what was done, or what was meant to be done,
during that early sail era; but two things appear quite certainly. There is
still shown the vehemence and determination of action which
characterized galley fighting, visible constantly in the fierce effort to
grapple the enemy, to break his ranks, to confuse and crush him; and
further there is clear indication of tactical plan on the grand scale, broad

in outline and combination, involving different--but not
independent--action by the various great divisions of the fleet, each of
which, in plan at least, has its own part, subordinate but contributory to
the general whole.
The results, though not unimportant, were not satisfactory, for men
were compelled to see that from various causes the huge numbers
brought upon the field lapsed into confusion, and that battle, however
well planned in large outline, resolved itself into a mere mass of
warring units incoherently struggling one with another. There was lack
of proportion between effort exerted and effect achieved. A period of
systematization and organization set in. Unwieldy numbers were
reduced to more manageable dimensions by excluding ships whose size
and strength did not add to the efficiency of the order of battle; the
powers and limitations of those which remained were studied, and
certain simple tactical dispositions, fitted to particular emergencies,
were recognized and adopted,--all tending to impart unity of movement
and action, and to keep the whole in regulated order under the hand of
the commander-in-chief, free from confusion.
To this point there was improvement; but reaction, as often, went too
far. The change in accepted ideas is emphatically shown by a
comparison of the Fighting Instructions of 1740 and 1756, when the
crystallization of the system was complete but disintegration had not
yet begun, with those issued in 1665 by the Duke of York, afterwards
James II., at the beginning of the second of the three Anglo-Dutch
Wars. His in turn are directly deducible from others framed shortly
after the first war, in 1652-1654, when sail tactics had not passed the
stage of infancy, and were still strongly affected by the galley tradition.
There is here found, on the one hand, the prescription of the line of
battle,--a single column of ships formed in each other's wake,--with the
provision that if the enemy is to leeward, and awaits attack, the
headmost squadron of the British shall steer for the headmost of the
enemy's ships. This accords with the general tenor of the later
Instructions; but there occurs elsewhere, and previously, the direction
that, when the enemy is to windward, if the leading British Squadron
finds it can weather any considerable part of them, it is to "tack and

stand in, and strive to divide the enemy's body," and that, "being got to
windward, is to bear down on those ships to leeward of them," which
have thus been cut off.
The thing to be observed here is the separate, but positive, initiative
prescribed for a portion of the fleet, with a view to divide the enemy,
and then concentrate the whole fleet upon the fraction thus isolated.
The British van takes a particular, but not an independent, action; for
the other divisions contribute their part to the common purpose. "The
middle squadron is to keep her wind, and to observe the motion of the
enemy's van, which" [that is, "which" action of the middle squadron]
"the last squadron--the rear--is to second; and both of these squadrons
are to do their utmost to assist or relieve the first squadron, that divided
the enemy's fleet." Evidently here we have tactical combination in
order to decisive action; clearly contemplated also beforehand, not
merely by a capable individual general, but