first into discontent with the existing order of things, might be
seduced into new and dangerous alliances. He determined, therefore, to
acquire the control of the left bank of the Mississippi to its mouth, and
by the purchase of the Floridas to give to Georgia and the Mississippi
territory (now constituting the States of Alabama and Mississippi)
unobstructed access to the Gulf.
But events beyond the ocean were working more rapidly for the interest
of the United States than any influence which the government itself
could exert. Before Mr. Monroe reached France in the spring of 1803,
another war-cloud of portentous magnitude was hanging over Europe.
The treaty of Amiens had proved only a truce. Awkwardly constructed,
misconstrued and violated by both parties, it was about to be formally
broken. Neither of the plenipotentiaries who signed the treaty was
skilled in diplomacy. Joseph Bonaparte acted for his brother; England
was represented by Lord Cornwallis, who twenty years before had
surrendered the British army at Yorktown. The wits of London
described him afterwards as a general who could neither conduct a war
nor conclude a peace.
Fearing that, in the threatened conflict, England, by her superior naval
force, would deprive him of his newly acquired colonial empire, and
greatly enhance her own prestige by securing all the American
possessions which France had owned prior to 1763, Bonaparte, by a
dash in diplomacy as quick and as brilliant as his tactics on the field of
battle, placed Louisiana beyond the reach of British power. After
returning to St. Cloud from the religious services of Easter Sunday,
April 10, 1803, he called two of his most trusted advisers, and, in a tone
of vehemence and passion, said,--
"I know the full value of Louisiana, and have been desirous of repairing
the fault of the French negotiators who lost it in 1763. A few lines of a
treaty have restored it to me, and now I must expect to lose it. . . . The
English wish to take possession of it, and it is thus they will begin the
war. . . . They have already twenty ships of the line in the Gulf of
Mexico. . . . The conquest of Louisiana would be easy. I have not a
moment to lose in putting it out of their reach. . . . The English have
successively taken from France the Canadas, Cape Breton,
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the richest portions of Asia. But they
shall not have the Mississippi, which they covet."
The discussion went far into the night. The two ministers differed
widely in the advice which they gave the First Consul; one was in favor
of holding Louisiana at all hazards; the other urged its prudent cession
rather than its inevitable loss by war. They both remained at St. Cloud
for the night. At daybreak the minister who had advised the cession
was summoned by Bonaparte to read dispatches from London, that
moment received, which certainly foreshadowed war, as the English
were making military and naval preparations with extraordinary
rapidity. After reading the dispatches, the First Consul said,
"Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I renounce
Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I will cede, it is the whole
colony without any reservation. I know the value of what I abandon. It
renounce it with the gravest regret. To attempt obstinately to retain it
would be folly. I direct you to negotiate this affair with the envoy of the
United States. Do not even wait the arrival of Mr. Monroe. Have an
interview this very day with Mr. Livingston. . . . But I require a great
deal of money for this war. I will be moderate. I want fifty millions for
Louisiana."
The minister, who was opposed to the sale, interposed, in a subsequent
interview, some observations "upon what the Germans call the souls, as
to whether they could be the subject of a contract or sale." Bonaparte
replied with undisguised sarcasm,--
"You are giving me the ideology of the law of nature. But I require
money to make war on the richest nation in the world. Send your
maxims to London. I am sure they will be greatly admired there."
The First Consul afterwards added, "Perhaps it will be objected that the
Americans will be found too powerful for Europe in two or three
centuries; but my foresight does not embrace such remote fears.
Besides, we may hereafter expect rivalries among the members of the
Union. The confederations, which are called perpetual, only last till one
of the contracting parties finds it in his interest to break them."
SUCCESS OF JEFFERSON'S DIPLOMACY.
Two days after this conversation Mr. Monroe opportunely arrived, and
on the 30th of April the treaty ceding Louisiana to the United States
was
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