Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky | Page 4

intelligence requirements, an SW carbon paper with instructions for its
use, three pre-written "cover" letters (apparently innocent letters, on the
reverse side of which the SW was to be concealed), and an OTP with
accompanying instructions. The CIA later determined that Tolkachev
had retrieved the materials.
In September, all three cover letters from Tolkachev were received, and
their SW contents successfully broken out. All three letters showed
signs of having been opened, presumably by the Soviet authorities, but
the SW had gone undetected.
The SW messages contained useful intelligence on such subjects as a
new Soviet airborne radar reconnaissance and guidance system, the
results of performance tests of new Soviet aircraft radar systems, and
the status of work on the weapons-aiming systems for various Soviet
aircraft under development. Tolkachev also indicated that he had 91
pages of handwritten notes that he wanted to pass. The intelligence
contained in these letters finally tipped the balance, convincing senior
CIA managers that Tolkachev should be considered a valid volunteer.
As a result, Hathaway was given the go-ahead to arrange a personal
meeting with him in order to construct an in-country communications
system between him and the CIA.
On New Year's Day 1979, the CIA took advantage of Soviet holiday
laxness to arrange its first personal meeting with Tolkachev. After
ensuring that he was free from surveillance, Guilsher used a public
phone to call Tolkachev at his apartment, triggering contact at a
predetermined meeting site. He reminded Tolkachev to bring the 91
pages of notes with him. A 40-minute meeting was held while walking
the streets of Moscow in bitterly cold weather.
Tolkachev was well prepared. He delivered the voluminous notes,

which contained a detailed description of the highly sensitive work in
which he was involved, as well as exact formulas, diagrams, drawings
of oscilloscope presentations, precise weapon and electronic systems
specifications, charts, and quotes from official documents. He had
carefully drawn various diagrams and charts on oversize graph paper.
Guilsher passed Tolkachev additional intelligence requirements and
operational questions, as well as a payment of "good faith" money. He
was impressed with Tolkachev's calm manner. He also noted that
Tolkachev was probably one of the few sober Russians in Moscow on
this major national holiday.
Impressive Production
The information that Tolkachev provided in his first meeting was
quickly disseminated to a limited number of senior civilian and military
customers. It had an immediate impact, as reflected in a March 1979
memorandum sent to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by a
high-ranking military recipient of the Tolkachev information. This
memo stated that all the information provided by the "special source"
had correlated fully with existing holdings from photo and
communications intelligence collection. Regarding the new data
reported, the memo concluded that the Soviets would judge it quite
damaging to their interests for Washington to be in possession of this
information.
The memo continued by stipulating that the primary value of the
source's reporting was that it provided detailed data on new Soviet
weapon systems that would not be available from technical collection
sources for many years, if ever. The complete documentation on these
systems, which the agent provided even before the systems were fully
operational, was described as "of incalculable value."
In May 1979, the CIA hosted a three-day seminar for a small group of
senior customers of Tolkachev's product. Representatives included
senior analysts from both civilian and military intelligence agencies.
This group's consensus was that Tolkachev's information was
impressive. Military representatives attending the seminar stated that
the data he provided had saved them "up to five years of R&D time."

Tolkachev was on his way to becoming one of the most valuable and
productive agents in the history of the CIA.
Assessment and Background
Before the first personal meeting with Tolkachev, one of his
handwritten notes had been passed to the CIA's Office of Technical
Service (OTS) handwriting experts for analysis. The analysis, done in
May 1978, was positive, accurate, and even prophetic. The report made
the following observations:
The writer is intelligent, purposeful, and generally self-confident. He is
self-disciplined, but not overly rigid. He has well above-average
intelligence and has good organizing ability. He is observant and
conscientious and pays meticulous attention to details. He is quite
self-assured and may plow ahead at times in a way which is not discreet
or subtle. All in all, he is a reasonably well-adjusted individual and
appears intellectually and psychologically equipped to become a useful,
versatile asset.
After his early reluctance to identify himself to the US officials he was
trying to contact, Tolkachev over time provided a great deal of
information about himself. He wrote that he was born in 1927 in
Aktyubinsk (in what is now Kazakhstan), but moved to Moscow two
years later and had lived there ever since. He did not provide any