Three Years War | Page 8

furthest
outposts, whose duty it was to signal by means of their fires.]
[Footnote 14: Pioneers.]
CHAPTER III
Ladysmith Besieged
The Orange Free State and the South African Republic held a joint

council of war on the 1st of November, and it was then decided to lay
siege to Ladysmith.
We also agreed to send out a horse-commando in the direction of
Estcourt. This commando, under Vice-General Louis Botha, had
several skirmishes with the enemy. On the 15th of November he
engaged an armoured train, capturing a hundred of the British troops.
This was General Botha's chief exploit, and shortly afterwards he
returned to camp. But I must not anticipate.
On the night of the council of war, General Piet Cronje was sent to
occupy positions to the south and south-west of Ladysmith. He had
with him the Heilbron burghers, a part of the commandos from
Winburg and Harrismith, and two Krupp guns. On the following day a
brush took place with the enemy, who, however, speedily fell back on
Ladysmith. On the 3rd, a few of their infantry regiments, with a
thousand or fifteen hundred mounted troops, and two batteries of 15
and 12-pound Armstrong guns, marched out of the town in a
south-westerly direction.
The English brought these two guns into position at such a distance
from us that we could not reach them with the Mauser; nor would it
have been safe for us to advance upon them, for between them and us
lay an open plain, which would have afforded no cover. One of our
guns, which was placed exactly in front of the enemy, did indeed begin
to fire; but after a shot or two, it received so much attention from the
English artillery that we were compelled--just as at Rietfontein--to
desist.
The British infantry and cavalry did not show any excessive eagerness
to tackle us; and we, on our side, were as disinclined to come to close
quarters with them. Nevertheless, the enemy's infantry, backed up by
the thunder of twelve guns, did make an attempt to reach us; but though
they advanced repeatedly, they were for the most part careful to keep
out of range of our rifles. When they neglected this precaution, they
soon found themselves compelled to retire with loss.
Our second gun, which had been placed on a tafel-kop[15] to the east of

the ground where the engagement was taking place, did excellent work.
It effectually baulked the enemy's mounted troops in their repeated
efforts to outflank us on that side, and also made it impossible for the
English to bring their guns farther east, so as to command the tafel-kop.
They did, indeed, make an attempt to place some guns between us and
Platrand, which lay to the north of our eastern position, but it was
unsuccessful, for our Krupp on the tafel-kop brought such a heavy fire
to bear on the troops and gunners, that they were forced to retire.
We, on our part, as I have already said, found it equally impossible to
storm the English positions. To advance would have been to expose
ourselves to the fire of their heavy guns, whereas an attack to the south
would have involved exposure to a cross-fire from the guns on
Platrand.
Altogether it was a most unsatisfactory engagement for us both.
Nothing decisive was effected; and, as is always the case in such battles,
little was done except by the big guns, which kept up a perpetual roar
from ten in the morning until five in the afternoon. At that hour the
British fell back on Ladysmith.
Our loss was one killed and six wounded, among the latter being
Veldtcornet Marthinus Els, of Heilbron.
It was evident that the English did not escape without loss, but we were
unable to ascertain its extent. My own opinion is that they did not lose
very heavily.
From that day nothing of importance happened until I left Natal;
though both the Transvaalers and Free State burghers had a few slight
brushes with the enemy.
During the night of December the 7th, "Long Tom," the big Transvaal
gun, which had been placed on Bulwana Hill, had been so seriously
damaged by dynamite, that it had to remain out of action for some time.
We all admitted that the English on that occasion acted with great skill
and prudence, and that the courage of their leaders deserved every
praise. Yet, if we had only been on our guard, we might have beaten off

the storming party; but they had caught us unawares. Nevertheless, the
mishap taught us a useful lesson: henceforth the Transvaal
Commandants were more strict, and their increased severity had an
excellent effect both on the burghers and gunners.
General Sir Redvers Buller had landed at Cape Town early in
November. We were now