Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists | Page 7

COLOURS.
HYL. Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects?
PHIL. The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal Substances existing without the mind?
HYL. They are.
PHIL. And have true and real colours inhering in them?
HYL. Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it.
PHIL. How! is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight?
HYL. There is not.
PHIL. And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive immediately?
HYL. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I tell you, we do not.
PHIL. Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more, whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses, except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but I would now be informed, whether you still persist in the same opinion.
HYL. I do.
PHIL. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, or made up of sensible qualities?
HYL. What a question that is! who ever thought it was?
PHIL. My reason for asking was, because in saying, EACH VISIBLE OBJECT HATH THAT COLOUR WHICH WE SEE IN IT, you make visible objects to be corporeal substances; which implies either that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that there is something besides sensible qualities perceived by sight: but, as this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still maintained by you, it is a clear consequence, that your CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE is nothing distinct from SENSIBLE QUALITIES.
HYL. You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my own meaning.
PHIL. I wish you would make me understand it too. But, since you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance examined, I shall urge that point no farther. Only be pleased to let me know, whether the same colours which we see exist in external bodies, or some other.
HYL. The very same.
PHIL. What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour?
HYL. I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They are only apparent colours.
PHIL. APPARENT call you them? how shall we distinguish these apparent colours from real?
HYL. Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which, appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach.
PHIL. And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are discovered by the most near and exact survey.
HYL. Right.
PHIL. Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a microscope, or by the naked eye?
HYL. By a microscope, doubtless.
PHIL. But a microscope often discovers colours in an object different from those perceived by the unassisted sight. And, in case we had microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no object whatsoever, viewed through them, would appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the naked eye.
HYL. And what will you conclude from all this? You cannot argue that there are really and naturally no colours on objects: because by artificial managements they may be altered, or made to vanish.
PHIL. I think it may evidently be concluded from your own concessions, that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a microscope. Then' as to what you say by way of prevention: I ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one which is less sharp?
HYL. By the former without doubt.
PHIL. Is it not plain from DIOPTRICS that microscopes make the sight more penetrating, and represent objects as they would appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a most exquisite sharpness?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. Consequently the microscopical representation is to be thought that which best sets forth the real nature of the thing, or what it is in itself. The colours, therefore, by it perceived are more genuine and real than those perceived otherwise.
HYL. I confess there is something in what you say.
PHIL. Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness escape our sight. What think you of those inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses? must we suppose they are all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be imagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving their bodies from