Thoughts on Religion | Page 7

this we first observed that, if the supporters of
metaphysical teleology objected à priori to the method whereby the
genesis of natural law was deduced from the datum of the persistence
of force, in that this method involved an unrestricted use of illegitimate

symbolic conceptions; then it is no less open to an atheist to object à
priori to the method whereby a directing Mind was inferred from the
datum of cosmic harmony, in that this method involved the postulation
of an unknowable cause,--and this of a character which the whole
history of human thought has proved the human mind to exhibit an
overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of natural phenomena.
On these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as their respective
standing à priori is concerned, both theories may be regarded as about
equally suspicious. And similarly with regard to their standing à
posteriori; for as both theories require to embody at least one infinite
term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutely inconceivable.
But, finally, if the question were put to me which of the two theories I
regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is a question which
no one man can answer for another. For as the test of absolute
inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a man wishes
to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by what I
have designated relative inconceivability--i.e. in accordance with the
verdict given by his individual sense of probability as determined by
his previous habit of thought. And forasmuch as the test of relative
inconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately to vary with the
character of the mind which applies it, the strictly rational probability
of the question to which it is applied varies in like manner. Or
otherwise presented, the only alternative for any man in this matter is
either to discipline himself into an attitude of pure scepticism, and thus
to refuse in thought to entertain either a probability or an improbability
concerning the existence of a God; or else to incline in thought towards
an affirmation or a negation of God, according as his previous habits of
thought have rendered such an inclination more facile in the one
direction than in the other. And although, under such circumstances, I
should consider that man the more rational who carefully suspended his
judgement, I conclude that if this course is departed from, neither the
metaphysical teleologist nor the scientific atheist has any perceptible
advantage over the other in respect of rationality. For as the formal
conditions of a metaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the
one hand, and the formal conditions of a speculative atheism are as
undoubtedly present on the other, there is thus in both cases a logical
vacuum supplied wherein the pendulum of thought is free to swing in

whichever direction it may be made to swing by the momentum of
preconceived ideas.
'§ 6. Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the
abstract nature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which
at the present time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the
confusing amount of good, bad and indifferent literature on both sides
of the controversy which is extant;--considering these things, I do not
think that the result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the
score of its lacking precision. At a time like the present, when
traditional beliefs respecting Theism are so generally accepted, and so
commonly concluded as a matter of course to have a large and valid
basis of induction whereon to rest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of
this short essay, by showing how very concise the scientific status of
the subject really is, will do more to settle the minds of most readers as
to the exact standing at the present time of all the probabilities of the
question, than could a perusal of all the rest of the literature upon this
subject. And, looking to the present condition of speculative
philosophy, I regard it as of the utmost importance to have clearly
shown that the advance of science has now entitled us to assert, without
the least hesitation, that the hypothesis of Mind in nature is as certainly
superfluous to account for any of the phenomena of nature, as the
scientific doctrine of the persistence of force and the indestructibility of
matter is certainly true.
'On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logical
aspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite as
has the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter which
does not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of necessity
be left for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears