Theodicy | Page 3

Catholic
régime as the embodiment of intolerance. But this was not practical
politics on the Continent; you must tolerate Catholicism on an equal
footing, and come to terms with Catholic régimes. Leibniz was not
going to damn the Pope with true Protestant fervour. It was his
consistent aim to show that his theological principles were as
serviceable to Catholic thinkers as to the doctors of his own church. On
some points, indeed, he found his most solid support from Catholics; in

other places there are hints of a joint Catholic-Lutheran front against
Calvinism. But on the whole Leibniz's writings suggest that the
important decisions cut across all the Churches, and not between them.
Leibniz was impelled to a compromise with 'popery', not only by the
religious divisions of Germany, but (at one stage) by the political
weakness of the German Protestant States. At the point of Louis XIV's
highest success, the Protestant princes had no hope but in Catholic
Austria, and Austria was distracted by Turkish pressure in the rear.
Leibniz hoped to relieve the situation by preaching a crusade. Could
not the Christian princes sink their differences and unite against the
infidel? And could not the Christian alliance be cemented by
theological agreement? Hence Leibniz's famous negotiation with
Bossuet for a basis of Catholic-Lutheran concord. It was plainly
destined to fail; and it was bound to recoil upon its author. How could
he be a true Protestant who treated the differences with the Catholics as
non-essentials? How could he have touched pitch and taken no
defilement? Leibniz was generally admired, but he was not widely
trusted. As a mere politician, he may be judged to have over-reached
himself.
It has been the object of the preceding paragraphs to show that
Leibniz[11] the politician and Leibniz the theologian were one and the
same person; not at all to suggest that his rational theology was just
political expediency. We may apply to him a parody of his own
doctrine, the pre-established harmony between nature and grace.
Everything happens as though Leibniz were a liberal politician, and his
theology expressed his politics. Yes, but equally, everything happens as
though Leibniz were a philosophical theologian, and his politics
expressed his theology. His appreciation of Catholic speculation was
natural and sincere; his dogmatic ancestry is to be looked for in
Thomism and Catholic humanism as much as anywhere. Above all, he
had himself a liberal and generous mind. It gave him pleasure to
appreciate good wherever he could see it, and to discover a soul of truth
in every opinion.
From the moment when Leibniz became aware of himself as an

independent thinker, he was the man of a doctrine. Sometimes he called
it 'my principles', sometimes 'the new system', sometimes
'pre-established harmony'. It could be quite briefly expressed; he was
always ready to oblige his friends with a summary statement, either in a
letter or an enclosed memorandum, and several such have come down
to us. The doctrine may have been in Leibniz's view simple, but it was
applicable to every department of human speculation or enquiry. It
provided a new alphabet of philosophical ideas, and everything in
heaven and earth could be expressed in it; not only could be, but ought
to be, and Leibniz showed tireless energy in working out restatements
of standing problems.
As a man with an idea, with a philosophical nostrum, Leibniz may be
compared to Bishop Berkeley. There was never any more doubt that
Leibniz was a Leibnitian than that Berkeley was a Berkeleian. But there
is no comparison between the two men in the width of their range.
About many things Berkeley never took the trouble to Berkeleianize.
To take the most surprising instance of his neglect--he assured the
world that his whole doctrine pointed to, and hung upon, theology. But
what sort of a theology? He scarcely took the first steps in the
formulation of it. He preferred to keep on defending and explaining his
esse est percipi. With Leibniz it is wholly different; he carries his new
torch into every corner, to illuminate the dark questions.
The wide applicability of pre-established harmony might come home to
its inventor as a rich surprise. The reflective historian will find it
less[12] surprising, for he will suspect that the applications were in
view from the start. What was Leibniz thinking of when the new
principle flashed upon him? What was he not thinking of? He had a
many-sided mind. If the origins of the principle were complex, little
wonder that its applications were manifold. Every expositor of Leibniz
who does not wish to be endlessly tedious must concentrate attention
on one aspect of Leibniz's principle, and one source of its origin. We
will here give an account of the matter which, we trust, will go most
directly to the