Theaetetus | Page 9

we only see, or rather seem to see
things clearly, when they have been long fixed and defined. In the age
of Plato, the limits of the world of imagination and of pure abstraction,
of the old world and the new, were not yet fixed. The Greeks, in the
fourth century before Christ, had no words for 'subject' and 'object,' and

no distinct conception of them; yet they were always hovering about
the question involved in them. The analysis of sense, and the analysis
of thought, were equally difficult to them; and hopelessly confused by
the attempt to solve them, not through an appeal to facts, but by the
help of general theories respecting the nature of the universe.
Plato, in his Theaetetus, gathers up the sceptical tendencies of his age,
and compares them. But he does not seek to reconstruct out of them a
theory of knowledge. The time at which such a theory could be framed
had not yet arrived. For there was no measure of experience with which
the ideas swarming in men's minds could be compared; the meaning of
the word 'science' could scarcely be explained to them, except from the
mathematical sciences, which alone offered the type of universality and
certainty. Philosophy was becoming more and more vacant and abstract,
and not only the Platonic Ideas and the Eleatic Being, but all
abstractions seemed to be at variance with sense and at war with one
another.
The want of the Greek mind in the fourth century before Christ was not
another theory of rest or motion, or Being or atoms, but rather a
philosophy which could free the mind from the power of abstractions
and alternatives, and show how far rest and how far motion, how far the
universal principle of Being and the multitudinous principle of atoms,
entered into the composition of the world; which could distinguish
between the true and false analogy, and allow the negative as well as
the positive a place in human thought. To such a philosophy Plato, in
the Theaetetus, offers many contributions. He has followed philosophy
into the region of mythology, and pointed out the similarities of
opposing phases of thought. He has also shown that extreme
abstractions are self-destructive, and, indeed, hardly distinguishable
from one another. But his intention is not to unravel the whole subject
of knowledge, if this had been possible; and several times in the course
of the dialogue he rejects explanations of knowledge which have germs
of truth in them; as, for example, 'the resolution of the compound into
the simple;' or 'right opinion with a mark of difference.'
...
Terpsion, who has come to Megara from the country, is described as
having looked in vain for Euclides in the Agora; the latter explains that
he has been down to the harbour, and on his way thither had met

Theaetetus, who was being carried up from the army to Athens. He was
scarcely alive, for he had been badly wounded at the battle of Corinth,
and had taken the dysentery which prevailed in the camp. The mention
of his condition suggests the reflection, 'What a loss he will be!' 'Yes,
indeed,' replies Euclid; 'only just now I was hearing of his noble
conduct in the battle.' 'That I should expect; but why did he not remain
at Megara?' 'I wanted him to remain, but he would not; so I went with
him as far as Erineum; and as I parted from him, I remembered that
Socrates had seen him when he was a youth, and had a remarkable
conversation with him, not long before his own death; and he then
prophesied of him that he would be a great man if he lived.' 'How true
that has been; how like all that Socrates said! And could you repeat the
conversation?' 'Not from memory; but I took notes when I returned
home, which I afterwards filled up at leisure, and got Socrates to
correct them from time to time, when I came to Athens'...Terpsion had
long intended to ask for a sight of this writing, of which he had already
heard. They are both tired, and agree to rest and have the conversation
read to them by a servant...'Here is the roll, Terpsion; I need only
observe that I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the
interlocutory words, "said I," "said he"; and that Theaetetus, and
Theodorus, the geometrician of Cyrene, are the persons with whom
Socrates is conversing.'
Socrates begins by asking Theodorus whether, in his visit to Athens, he
has found any Athenian youth likely to attain distinction in science.
'Yes, Socrates, there is one very remarkable youth, with whom I have
become acquainted. He is no beauty, and therefore you need not
imagine that I am in love with him; and, to