The World Decision | Page 4

verbal orders.
But all this might be a mere "preparation," an argument that could not
be used diplomatically at the Consulta, yet of vital force.
There was the sudden twenty-four-hour visit of the Italian Ambassador
at Paris to Rome. Why had he taken that long journey home for such a
brief visit, consumed in conferences with the ministers? And Prince
von Bülow had rallied to his assistance the Catholic Deputy Erzburger.
Rome was seething with rumor.
* * * * *
The remarkable passivity of the Italian public during these anxious
moments was due in good part, no doubt, to its thorough confidence in
the men who were directing the state, specifically in the Prime Minister
Salandra and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Baron Sonnino, who were
the Government. They were honest,--that everybody admitted,--and
they were experienced. In less troubled times the nation might prefer
the popular politician Giolitti, who had a large majority of the deputies
in the Parliament in his party, and who had presented Italy a couple of
years earlier with its newest plaything, Libya,--and concealed the bills.
But Giolitti had prudently retired to his little Piedmont home in Cavour.
All the winter he had kept out of Rome, leaving the Salandra
Government to work out a solution of the knotty tangle in which he had
helped to involve his country. Nobody knew precisely what Giolitti's
views were, but it was generally accepted that he preserved the
tradition of the Crispi statesmanship, which had made the abortion of
the Triple Alliance. If he could not openly champion an active
fulfillment of the alliance, at least he was avowedly neutralista, the
best that Berlin and Vienna had come to hope from their southern ally.
He was the great unknown factor politically, with his majority in the
Chamber, his personal prestige. A clever American, long resident in

Rome in sufficient intimacy with the political powers to make his
words significant, told me,--"The country does not know what it wants.
But Giolitti will tell them. When he comes we shall know whether
there will be war!" That was May 9--a Sunday. Giolitti arrived in Rome
the same week--and we knew, but not as the political prophet
thought....
Meanwhile, there were mutterings of the thunder to come out of this
stagnant hesitation. One day I went out to the little town of Genzano in
the Alban Hills, with an Italian mother who wished to see her son in
garrison there. The regiment of Sardinian Granatieri, ordinarily
stationed near the King in Rome, had been sent to this dirty little hill
town to keep order. The populace were so threatening in their attitude
that the soldiers were confined in their quarters to prevent street rows.
We could see their heads at the windows of the old houses and
convents where they were billeted, like schoolboys in durance vile. I
read the word "Socilismo" scrawled in chalk over the walls and
half-effaced by the hand of authority. The hard faces of the townsfolk
scowled at us while we talked with a young captain. The Genzanans
were against the war, the officer said, and stoned the soldiers. They did
not want another African jaunt, with more taxes and fewer men to till
the fields.
Elsewhere one heard that the "populace" generally was opposed to war.
"We shall have to shoot up some hundreds of the rats in Florence
before the troops leave," the youthful son of a prefect told me. That in
the North. As for the South, a shrug of the shoulders expressed the
national doubt of Calabria, Sicily,--the weaker, less certain members of
the family. Remembering the dire destruction of the earthquake in the
Abruzzi, which wrought more ruin to more people than the Messina
catastrophe, also the floods that had destroyed crops in the fertile river
bottoms a few weeks before, one could understand popular opposition
to more dangers and more taxes. These were some of the perplexities
that beset the Government. No wonder that the diplomats were
weighing their words cautiously at the Consulta, also weighing with
extreme fineness the quid pro quo they would accept as
"compensation" from Austria for upsetting the Balkan situation. It was,

indeed, a delicate matter to decide how many of those national
aspirations might be sacrificed for the sake of present security without
jeopardizing the nation's future. Italy needed the wisdom of patriots if
ever in her history.
The Salandra Government kept admirable order during these dangerous
days, suppressing the slightest popular movement, pro or con. That was
the wise way, until they knew themselves which road to take and had
prepared the public mind. And they had plenty of troops to be occupied
somehow. The exercise of the firm hand of authority against popular
ebullitions is always a marvel to the American. To the European