The Voyage of Captain Popanilla | Page 6

in a savage state, the origin of
society, and the elements of the social compact, in sentences which
would not have disgraced the mellifluous pen of Bentham. From these
he naturally digressed into an agreeable disquisition on the
Anglo-Saxons; and, after a little badinage on the Bill of Rights, flew off
to an airy aper u of the French Revolution. When he had arrived at the
Isle of Fantaisie he begged to inform his Majesty that man was born for
something else besides enjoying himself. It was, doubtless, extremely
pleasant to dance and sing, to crown themselves with chaplets, and to
drink wine; but he was 'free to confess' that he did not imagine that the
most barefaced hireling of corruption could for a moment presume to
maintain that there was any utility in pleasure. If there were no utility in
pleasure, it was quite clear that pleasure could profit no one. If,
therefore, it were unprofitable, it was injurious; because that which
does not produce a profit is equivalent to a loss; therefore pleasure is a
losing business; consequently pleasure is not pleasant.
* Substance of a speech, in Parliamentary language, means a printed
edition of an harangue which contains all that was uttered in the House,
and about as much again.

He also showed that man was not born for himself, but for society; that
the interests of the body are alone to be considered, and not those of the
individual; and that a nation might be extremely happy, extremely
powerful, and extremely rich, although every individual member of it
might at the same time be miserable, dependent, and in debt. He
regretted to observe that no one in the island seemed in the slightest
decree conscious of the object of his being. Man is created for a
purpose; the object of his existence is to perfect himself. Man is
imperfect by nature, because if nature had made him perfect he would
have had no wants; and it is only by supplying his wants that utility can
be developed. The development of utility is therefore the object of our
being, and the attainment of this great end the cause of our existence.
This principle clears all doubts, and rationally accounts for a state of
existence which has puzzled many pseudo-philosophers.
Popanilla then went on to show that the hitherto received definitions of
man were all erroneous; that man is neither a walking animal, nor a
talking animal, nor a cooking animal, nor a lounging animal, nor a
debt-incurring, animal, nor a tax-paying animal, nor a printing animal,
nor a puffing animal, but a developing animal. Development is the
discovery of utility. By developing the water we get fish; by developing
the earth we get corn, and cash, and cotton; by developing the air we
get breath; by developing the fire we get heat. Thus, the use of the
elements is demonstrated to the meanest capacity. But it was not
merely a material development to which he alluded; a moral
development was equally indispensable. He showed that it was
impossible for a nation either to think too much or to do too much. The
life of man was therefore to be passed in a moral and material
development until he had consummated his perfection. It was the
opinion of Popanilla that this great result was by no means so near at
hand as some philosophers flattered themselves; and that it might
possibly require another half-century before even the most civilised
nation could be said to have completed the destiny of the human race.
At the same time, he intimated that there were various extraordinary
means by which this rather desirable result might be facilitated; and
there was no saying what the building of a new University might do, of
which, when built, he had no objection to be appointed Principal.

In answer to those who affect to admire that deficient system of
existence which they style simplicity of manners, and who are
perpetually committing the blunder of supposing that every advance
towards perfection only withdraws man further from his primitive and
proper condition, Popanilla triumphantly demonstrated that no such
order as that which they associated with the phrase 'state of nature' ever
existed. 'Man,' said he, 'is called the masterpiece of nature; and man is
also, as we all know, the most curious of machines; now, a machine is a
work of art, consequently, the masterpiece of nature is the masterpiece
of art. The object of all mechanism is the attainment of utility; the
object of man, who is the most perfect machine, is utility in the highest
degree. Can we believe, therefore, that this machine was ever intended
for a state which never could have called forth its powers, a state in
which no utility could ever have been attained,