either strengthen or weaken, according as we see necessary. Fear, too,
sometimes must be removed, as Cicero, in his defense of Milo,
endeavors to assure the judges that Pompey's army, drawn up about the
Forum, is for their protection; and sometimes there will be an occasion
to intimidate them, as the same orator does in one of his pleadings
against Verres.
There are two ways of proceeding in this last case, the first plausible,
and frequently used, as when it is hinted to them that the Roman people
might entertain an ill opinion of them, or that there might be an appeal
from their judgment; the other desperate, and not so much used, as
when threatened with prosecution themselves if they suffer themselves
to be corrupted. This is a hazardous point, and is conducted with more
safety to the orator when in a large assembly where corrupt judges are
restrained by fear, and the upright have the majority. But I would never
counsel this before a single judge, unless every other resource was
wanting. If necessity requires it, I can not say that it is the business of
the art of oratory to give directions in the matter, any more than to
lodge an appeal, tho that, too, is often of service, or to cite the judge in
justice before he passes sentence, for to threaten, denounce, or indict
may be done by any one else as well as the orator.
If the cause itself should furnish sufficient reason for gaining the good
will of the judge, out of this whatever is most specious and favorable
may be inserted in the exordium. It will be unnecessary to enumerate
all the favorable circumstances in causes, they being easily known from
the state of facts; besides, no exact enumeration can take place on
account of the great diversity of law-suits. It is the cause itself,
therefore, that must teach us to find and improve these circumstances;
and, in like manner, with a circumstance that may make against us the
cause will inform us how it may either be made entirely void, or at least
invalidated.
From the cause compassion also sometimes arises, whether we have
already suffered or are likely to suffer anything grievous. For I am not
of the opinion of those who to distinguish the exordium from the
peroration, will have the one to speak of what is past and the other of
what is to come. They are sufficiently distinguished without this
discrimination. In the exordium the orator ought to be more reserved,
and ought only to throw out some hints of the sentiments of
compassion he designs to excite in the minds of the judges; whereas in
the peroration he may pour out all the passions, introduce persons
speaking, and make the dead to come forth, as it were, out of their
graves, and recommend to the judges the care of their dearest pledges.
All these particulars are seldom executed in the exordium. But the
manner just pointed out, it will be very proper to observe in it, and to
wear down all impressions to the contrary made by the opposite side,
that as our situation will be deplorable if we should be defeated in our
expectations, so, on the other hand, the behavior of our opponent would
be insolent and haughty.
MATERIAL FOR THE INTRODUCTION
Besides persons and causes, the exordium likewise is sometimes taken
from their adjuncts, that is, from things relating to the cause and
persons. To persons are applicable not only the pledges above
mentioned, but affinities, friendships, sometimes cities and whole
countries are also likely to suffer by the person's misfortunes.
Theophrastus adds another kind of exordium, taken from the pleading
of the orator who speaks first. Such seems to be that of Demosthenes
for Ctesiphon, in which he requests the judges to please permit him to
reply as he thinks suitable rather than to follow the rules prescribed by
the accuser.
As the confidence observable in some orators may easily pass for
arrogance, there are certain ways of behavior which, tho common, will
please, and therefore ought not to be neglected, to prevent their being
used by the opposing side: these are wishing, warding off suspicion,
supplicating, and making a show of trouble and anxiety.
The judge's attention is secured by inducing him to believe that the
matter under debate is new, important, extraordinary, or of a heinous
nature, or that it equally interests him and the public. Then his mind is
to be roused and agitated by hope, fear, remonstrance, entreaty, and
even by flattery, if it is thought that will be of any use. Another way of
procuring attention may be to promise that we shall take up but little of
their time, as we shall confine ourselves to the subject.
From
Continue reading on your phone by scaning this QR Code
Tip: The current page has been bookmarked automatically. If you wish to continue reading later, just open the
Dertz Homepage, and click on the 'continue reading' link at the bottom of the page.