The Training of a Public Speaker | Page 6

intention being to deceive others. When
Cicero boasted that he threw darkness on the minds of the judges, in the
cause of Cluentius, could it be said that he himself was unacquainted
with all the intricacies of his method of confusing their understanding
of the facts? Or shall a painter who so disposes his objects that some
seem to project from the canvas, others to sink in, be supposed not to
know that they are all drawn on a plain surface?
THE OBJECT OF A SPEECH
It is again objected that "Every art proposes to itself an end; but
rhetoric has no end, or does not put into execution the end it proposes
to itself." This is false, as is shown from what already has been said
concerning the end of rhetoric and in what it consists. The orator will
never fail to obtain this end, for he always will speak well. This
objection, therefore, can affect only those who make persuasion the end
of rhetoric; but our orator, and our definition of art, are not restricted to
events. An orator, indeed, strives to gain his cause; but suppose he
loses it, as long as he has pleaded well he fulfils the injunctions of his
art. A pilot desires to come safe into port, but if a storm sweeps away
his ship, is he, on that account, a less experienced pilot? His keeping
constantly to the helm is sufficient proof that he was not neglecting his
duty. A physician tries to cure a sick person, but if his remedies are
hindered in their operation by either the violence of the disease, the
intemperance of the patient, or some unforeseen accident, he is not to
be blamed, because he has satisfied all the directions of his art. So it is
with the orator, whose end is to speak well; for it is in the act, and not
in the effect, that art consists, as I shall soon make clear. Therefore, it is
false to say that "Art knows when it has obtained its end, but rhetoric
knows nothing of the matter," as if an orator could be ignorant of his
speaking well and to the purpose.
But it is said, further, that rhetoric, contrary to the custom of all other
arts, adopts vice, because it countenances falsehood and moves the
passions. Neither of these are bad practises, and consequently not

vicious, when grounded on substantial reasons. To disguise truth is
sometimes allowable even in the sage, and if a judge can not be brought
to do justice except by means of the passions, the orator must
necessarily have recourse to them. Very often the judges appointed to
decide are ignorant, and there is necessity for changing their wrongly
conceived opinions, to keep them from error. Should there be a bench,
a tribunal, an assembly of wise and learned judges whose hearts are
inaccessible to hatred, envy, hope, fear, prejudice, and the impositions
of false witnesses, there would be little occasion for the exertions of
eloquence and all that might seem requisite would be only to amuse the
ear with the harmony of cadence. But if the orator has to deal with light,
inconstant, prejudiced, and corrupt judges, and if many embarrassments
must be removed in order to throw light upon truth, then artful
stratagem must fight the battle, and set all its engines to work, for he
who is beaten out of the straight road can not get into it again except by
another turnabout.
ELOQUENCE ACQUIRED BY STUDY AND PRACTISE
These are the principal objections which have been made against
rhetoric. There are others of less moment but derived from the same
source. That rhetoric is an art is thus briefly demonstrated. If art, as
Cleanthes thinks, is a power which prepares a way and establishes an
order, can it be doubted that we must keep to a certain way and a
certain order for speaking well? And if, according to the most generally
accepted opinion, we ought to call art, everything which by a
combination of agreeing and co-exercised principles conducts to a
useful end, have we not already shown that nothing of all this is lacking
in rhetoric? Has it not, likewise, the two constituent parts of other arts,
theory and practise? Again, if dialect be an art, as it is granted, for the
same reason; so is rhetoric an art, the chief difference lying not so
much in the genus as in the species. But we must not forget this
observation, that art must be where a thing is done according to rule,
and not at random; and art must be where he who has learned succeeds
better than he who has not learned. But in matter of eloquence not only
will the ignorant person be surpassed by